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ARTICLES  
Statistical Precedent: Allocating 
Judicial Attention 
Ryan W. Copus* 
Suffering from a well-covered “crisis of volume,” the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals have patched together an ad hoc system of triage in an effort to 
provide cases with sufficient attention. For example, only some cases are 
assigned to central staff, analyzed by law clerks, orally argued, debated over 
by judges, or decided in published opinions. The courts have evaded overt 
disaster by increasing the number of active, senior, and visiting judges, but 
adding personnel poses its own demands on attention—judges must also pay 
attention to one another in order to coherently develop and apply the law. With 
too little time and too many voices, they have increasingly abandoned the 
effort to coordinate that uniform approach to judging: the courts now create 
traditional precedent in less than 10% of cases, some larger courts have 
 
 *  Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. As this Article is based on 
my doctoral dissertation, I cannot hope to acknowledge everyone who talked through the ideas, 
commented on drafts, or provided research assistance, and I apologize for omissions. I am 
grateful to my dissertation committee, Kevin Quinn (co-chair), Justin McCrary (co-chair), Sean 
Farhang, and Anne Joseph O’Connell for guidance; Jacob Gersen, Marin Levy, Rob MacCoun, 
and Holger Spamann for insights and encouragement; Ryan Hubert, Hannah Laqueur, and 
Julian Nyarko for painfully struggling through the analytic foundations; Climenko Fellows for 
their criticism and framing advice; and the research assistance of Jonathan Korn and Cullen 
O’Keefe. My thoughts on this project have evolved considerably, and some of the views presented 
here differ from those I discussed with the above-mentioned individuals.  
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stopped the practice of circulating opinion drafts to the full court, and en banc 
proceedings are initiated at a miniscule rate. 
This Article explains and illustrates how courts can leverage advances 
in artificial intelligence to more fairly and effectively allocate attention. A 
machine-generated mapping of a court’s historical decision patterns—what I 
term “statistical precedent”—can help a circuit court locate the district court, 
agency, staff attorney, law clerk, and panel decisions that are most 
incompatible with the court’s collective jurisprudence. Statistical precedent 
can also aid the court in identifying areas of law that are most in need of 
development. With the ability to locate likely errors and opportunities for law 
development, the circuit courts could distribute attention so as to revitalize 
their contribution to the rule of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals were once admired for their wealth 
of judicial attention and for their generosity in distributing it.1 At 
least by legend, almost all cases were afforded what William Richman 
and William Reynolds have termed the “Learned Hand Treatment.”2 
Guided by Judge Learned Hand’s commandment that “[t]hou shalt not 
ration justice,”3 a panel of three judges would read the briefs, hear oral 
argument, deliberate at length, and prepare multiple drafts of an 
opinion.4 Once finished, the judges would publish their opinion, 
binding themselves and their colleagues in accordance with the 
common-law tradition. The final opinion would be circulated to and 
read by every judge in the circuit, providing nonpanel judges with an 
opportunity to provide feedback or evaluate a decision for en banc 
review. And on top of this extensive attention was a reasonable chance 
for yet more, as the Supreme Court reviewed approximately 3% of the 
circuit courts’ decisions.5 But darker days were ahead. 
A caseload explosion greatly diminished the courts’ reservoir of 
judicial attention.6 Between 1960 and 2010, the courts’ caseload 
 
 1. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 3 (2013) (noting the “received and perhaps idealized 
tradition of the operation of the circuit courts”). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Judge Learned Hand, Keynote Address at the Legal Aid Society’s 75th Anniversary 
(1951), https://www.legalaidnyc.org/historical_event/thou-shalt-not-ration-justice/ [https:// 
perma.cc/23EX-BX7G]. 
 4. Judge Hand apparently “wouldn’t even let a law clerk write a sentence, not one 
sentence.” MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 107 n.92 (1970) (quoting Harold R. Medina, 
The Decisional Process, 20 B. BULL. N.Y. COUNTY LAW. ASS’N 94, 99 (1962)). 
 5. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURT OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 12 
tbl.2-1 (Dec. 18, 1998), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Commission-
on-Structural-Alternatives-for-the-Federal-Courts-of-Appeals-1998.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DQC-
5H6J]. 
 6. The caseload crisis and its ill effects have been the subject of a long line of studies and 
congressional commissions. For a detailed review, see RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 
128–64. 
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increased by 1,436%.7 The courts responded to this precipitous rise in 
workload with a series of moves to reduce the time and effort that 
judges spent on each case. They employed an army of staff attorneys 
to help decide cases and draft opinions, increased the number of law 
clerks from one to three or four per judge, and curtailed the 
availability of oral argument such that in 2017, it was provided in less 
than 20% of cases.8 Deliberation among judges on a panel is, by most 
accounts, rare, and almost 90% of decisions are made in terse, 
unpublished, and nonprecedential opinions.9 The courts now review a 
mere 0.19% of decisions en banc, down from 1.5% in 1964.10 And the 
Supreme Court has similarly reduced its contribution, reviewing only 
0.1% of circuit court decisions,11 down from approximately 3% in 
1950.12 
The shortage of attention threatens to undermine the courts’ 
ability to decide cases correctly and develop the law coherently. 
Without the time to carefully consider each case, circuit court judges—
traditionally serving as the main source of error correction in the 
federal courts—will inevitably make more errors of their own. 
Research, for example, shows that reversal rates in civil appeals 
declined as more attention was funneled to address the influx of 
immigration appeals.13 And, as already noted, the circuit courts have 
 
 7. Id. at 6. 
 8. Table B-10: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Cases Terminated on the Merits after Oral 
Arguments or Submission on Briefs, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 
30, 2017, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-10/judicial-business/2017/09/30 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4KJX-DBRH].  
 9. Table B-12: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Type of Opinion or Order Filed in Cases 
Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2017, 
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-12/judicial-business/2017/09/30 (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A8B9-QSLB].  
 10. A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: 
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 564 (1965). 
 11. Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
2 LANDSLIDE (Jan.–Feb. 2010), https://ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Supremecourt 
reversalrates.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7FY-HEY9]. 
 12. The Federal Judicial Center reports that 3,064 decisions were terminated by the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals in 1950. Caseloads: U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1892-2017, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-us-courts-appeals-1892-2017 (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/84AL-YS6N]. It also reports that the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in 103 cases in 1950. Caseloads: Supreme Court of the United States, Petitions for 
Certiorari, 1923-1969, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-supreme-
court-united-states-petitions-certiorari-1923-1969 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
FC87-WDB7]. 
 13. See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011) (demonstrating 
that civil reversal rates in the Second and Ninth Circuits fell in correlation with a heavier 
immigration workload). 
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dramatically reduced their contribution to the development of law.14 
In brief, the courts are struggling to perform their two main functions: 
error correction and law development. 
The ostensibly obvious solution—more judges—creates its own 
drains on attention. Judging is a social, collective enterprise. In order 
to apply and develop a coherent system of law, judges need attend to 
not only their own cases, but also to one another. In the age of legal 
realism, we cannot rely on a mechanical jurisprudence to coordinate 
the consistent application and development of law.15 And the 
proliferation of judges—250% since 196016—increases both the 
difficulty and importance of judges paying attention to other judges. 
Each judge has her own judicial philosophy, set of heuristics, and 
idiosyncrasies. When small in number, judges can learn and adapt to 
other judges, fitting their own unique judicial style into the broader 
jurisprudence of their courts. But in larger courts, judges work with 
one another less frequently, are unable to keep abreast of precedent 
produced by their colleagues,17 and lose touch with the norms that 
support a common sense of justice.18 More extreme panels, ideological 
 
 14. District courts, facing a dearth of precedent from the circuit courts, have increasingly 
turned to themselves for legal guidance. By my count (using an automated citation counter), 
between 1993 and 2013, district courts almost tripled the rate at which they cite to other district 
court opinions in their published opinions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the notion of a “district court 
split” has become much more common: the phrase returned only ten results in a LexisNexis 
search of district court opinions issued in 2004, but the same search of 2013 district court 
opinions returned seventy results. 
 15. See Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 76–79 (2010) (discussing how 
legal realism has led to an acceptance of indeterminacy and a more equitable form of review). 
 16. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 6. Note that this does not account for increased 
reliance on senior and visiting judges. 
 17. See The Case for Restructuring the Ninth Circuit: An Inevitable Response to an 
Unavoidable Problem: Hearing on Oversight of the Structure of the Federal Courts Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 9 (2018) [hereinafter O’Scannlain Statement] (written testimony of 
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) (“[E]ven 
our own judges have difficulty simply staying abreast of the circuit’s ever-expanding caselaw.”); 
Bringing Justice Closer to the People: Examining Ideas for Restructuring the 9th Circuit: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary,  115th Cong. 4–5 (2017) [hereinafter Kleinfeld Statement] (written statement of 
Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit): 
Judges on the same court should read each other’s decisions. We are so big that we 
cannot and do not. That has the practical effect that we do not know what judges on 
other panels are deciding. It is odd word usage to call a public body a “court,” in the 
singular, if its judges do not ever sit together as one body, and do not even read each 
other’s opinions. We may get the quotes right from other panels’ decisions, but there is 
no way anyone can get a feel for our court, as all attorneys do for smaller courts.  
 18. See, e.g., COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURT OF APPEALS, supra note 5, 
at 29 (“[T]here is consensus among appellate judges throughout the country . . . that a court of 
appeals, being a court whose members must work collegially over time to develop a consistent 
and coherent body of law, functions more effectively with fewer judges . . . .”); Stephen L. Wasby, 
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or otherwise, are impaneled,19 and the court becomes less capable of 
monitoring and correcting their excesses.20 In the words of one judge 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, larger courts 
struggle to form a “reckonable court.”21 
In summary, judging has become a more time-pressured and 
solipsistic exercise.22 In order to thoughtfully and coherently apply 
and develop the law, courts must be careful in allocating their limited 
attention. As it stands, the courts are struggling to patch together an 
ad hoc triage system. Little is known about who makes triage 
decisions or how they are made, and practices differ considerably 
across circuits, but they are routinely a product of discretion and 
 
Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for Collegiality, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 73, 
129–32 (1987) (reporting concerns of Ninth Circuit judges that the size of the court reduces 
collegiality); see also O’Scannlain Statement, supra note 17, at 8–9 (“[T]he sheer number of 
judges on our court often means that we work ‘together’ only nominally. . . . It should be no 
surprise that it becomes difficult to establish effective working relationships in discerning the 
law when we sit together so rarely.”); Rebooting the Ninth Circuit: Why Technology Cannot Solve 
Its Problems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 12–13 (2017) (written statement of Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judge, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit):  
Collegiality is extremely important in our appellate system. The genius of the 
appellate process is founded upon the close collaboration of jurists who combine their 
independent judgment, informed by their personal experiences, and apply their 
collective wisdom to decide the issues presented by an appeal. Only by sitting together 
regularly can members of a court come to know one another and work most effectively 
in common pursuit of the right answer under the Rule of Law. 
 19. D.H. Kaye, On a Mathematical Argument for Splitting the Ninth Circuit, 48 
JURIMETRICS J.L. SCI. & TECH. 329 (2008); see also Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, 
Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by 
Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 372–75 (1995) 
(discussing evidence that visiting district court judges increase aberrancy of decisions). 
 20. See O’Scannlain Statement, supra note 17, at 11 (“Our court regularly receives around 
800 petitions for en banc review a year. . . . Identifying which of those 800 petitions merits 
further review is a labor-intensive task . . . . There are, alas, only so many hours in a day.”); 
Review of the Report by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Regarding the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
84 (1999) (statement of Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit) (“When a circuit [g]rows to a size such that its judges cannot read and correct other 
panels’ decisions, district judges and lawyers trying to figure out what the law is are compelled 
to say that it depends on who is on the panel.”). 
 21. Kleinfeld Statement, supra note 17, at 7. 
 22. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Federal Courts Today and Tomorrow: A Summary and 
Survey, 38 S.C. L. REV 393, 405–06 (1987):  
[T]his sparse review promotes a lack of discipline among judges sitting on the courts 
of appeals. . . . What we have . . . is a collection of very able judges who work very 
hard, but essentially on an individual basis, without very much in the way of careful 
guidance, and far too little authoritative guidance . . . . The consequence is that the 
system of precedent on which the common law is based has lost much of its structure 
and influence. . . . In essence, what we now have is rapidly becoming a discretionary 
approach to justice. 
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proxy.23 Staff attorneys are assigned to make initial decisions and 
draft opinions in pro se, immigration, social security, and 
“straightforward” appeals.24 Oral argument is denied where the 
“decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument.”25 An opinion is supposed to be published if it “establishes, 
alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law.”26 En banc is 
reserved for circumstances where it is “necessary to secure or 
maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” or if an appeal “involves 
a question of exceptional importance.”27 Many courts have effectively 
abandoned the effort to keep judges aware of their court’s new 
precedent, jettisoning the practice of precirculating opinions to 
nonpanel colleagues.28 
This Article argues that a system of statistical precedent can 
help the courts more fairly and effectively allocate attention, thereby 
promoting the courts’ error-correcting and law-developing functions. 
Like traditional precedent, statistical precedent is the product of a 
court’s historical decisions. But in contrast to traditional precedent, 
which is based on outcomes and reasoning in a handful of judge-
identified “similar” cases, statistical precedent is based on finely tuned 
patterns automatically mined from large-scale datasets of previous 
decisions. In short, a statistical precedent is a precise, rigorous, and 
machine-generated answer to a critical question: How frequently has 
the court reversed cases like this one? By exploiting the statistical 
associations between circuit court decisions and case characteristics 
(e.g., case subject matter; lower court outcome; identity of the lower 
court judge; whether a case was decided by motion to dismiss, 
summary judgment, bench trial, or jury trial; text content of briefs; 
the presence of an amicus brief), we can use a court’s past 
decisionmaking patterns to predict the probability that a court will 
reverse each lower court decision. And the information embedded in 
 
 23. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case 
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 (2011). 
 24. Id. at 331, 346. 
 25. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). At least sometimes, staff attorneys have substantial influence 
in this decision. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 34.13(A):  
The judges of the court screen cases with assistance from the Staff Attorney. When 
the last brief is filed, a case is generally sent to the Staff Attorney for prescreening 
classification. If the Staff Attorney concludes that the case does not warrant oral 
argument . . . . [t]he clerk then routes the case to 1 of the court’s judges. 
 26. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a). 
 27. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
 28. See Levy, supra note 23, at 365 n.330 (offering the Second Circuit as an example of a 
court that “almost never precirculates opinions beyond the original panel”). 
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such a prediction is invaluable to restoring the circuit courts’ central 
role in the justice system. 
Specifically, statistical precedent provides courts with three 
critical pieces of information. First, it allows courts to identify which 
of its decisions—whether made by a staff attorney, law clerk, judge, or 
panel—are most incompatible with the court’s collective 
jurisprudence. Second, statistical precedent lets a court know which 
appeals would likely be correctly decided even with limited attention: 
cases with very high or low statistical precedent represent the “easy” 
cases that are almost always decided the same way. Third, it allows 
the court to identify the “hard” cases that provide the most promising 
opportunities to develop the law; a statistical precedent close to 50% 
indicates that the governing law is insufficient to generate a judicial 
consensus as to the proper outcome. 
While statistical precedent may have the capacity to transform 
the administration of justice, I offer a set of limited reforms for the 
more immediate future: (1) when a panel decision deviates widely 
from statistical precedent, the court should flag it and circulate it to 
nonpanel judges so that they have an opportunity to offer feedback 
and consider it for en banc review; (2) if such an outlier decision is 
made in an unpublished opinion, it should also be added to a public 
“high-risk” list so as to discourage abuse of this particularly 
controversial form of justice; (3) courts should stop using proxies (e.g., 
“pro se” as a proxy for “easy affirmance”) when deciding which cases 
should be assigned to staff attorneys and instead use statistical 
precedent to identify the consensus affirmances and reversals that are 
most appropriate for assignment to central staff; and (4) judges should 
default to publishing opinions when statistical precedent is close to 
50%. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the basic 
process of mapping a court’s statistical precedent. In a nontechnical 
manner, I explain how machine learning can be leveraged to craft an 
individually tailored precedent for each case. I also compare statistical 
precedent to the traditional rule of precedent, discussing its relative 
strengths and weaknesses. Of particular importance is that 
traditional precedent becomes less effective as caseloads and court 
sizes grow, while statistical precedent increases in accuracy with the 
size of datasets. In brief, statistical precedent is a system of precedent 
suited for the modern world. 
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Part II reviews Marin Levy’s “resource allocation framework” 
for assessing the allocation of judicial attention.29 Levy argues that 
error correction tends to be maximized by conserving judicial attention 
when a case would likely be decided correctly without it.30 Law 
development, too, suffers little if these cases receive minimal judicial 
attention, as the types of cases that can be decided correctly without 
judicial attention are unlikely to involve legal issues that need 
clarification.31 I argue that Levy’s framework is limited by its 
implicitly formalist treatment of error. “Error” is deeply contested, and 
the fact that judges have conflicting notions of error is a defining 
feature of adjudication.32 What if some panels would assign error to a 
case and others would not? The framework also obscures the fact that 
judicial attention can be allocated to correct a circuit court’s own 
errors and that it can occur in a multistage process. In short, it is not 
cases that need attention, but decisions—lower court and agency 
decisions, yes, but also staff attorney, law clerk, and panel decisions. 
The circuit courts do not employ a “Two-Track system.”33 It is a 
sprawling, multilevel system of review. 
Part III presents an expanded conceptual framework. I 
introduce the concepts degree of error and degree of instability. The 
degree of error is the extent to which a decision departs from a court’s 
collective judgment. For example, if a panel reverses a case that only 
10% of possible panels would reverse, the panel’s decision has a 90% 
degree of error, and the court’s error-correcting function would be 
promoted by focusing the court’s attention on such an outlier. A case’s 
degree of instability is the extent to which possible panels would 
disagree as to its correct outcome. Instability is maximized where half 
of panels would reverse a case and half would affirm. I argue that a 
case with high instability is an opportunity to develop law: if the 
governing law cannot generate consensus among judges, it is also 
likely failing to provide society the ability to plan and organize its 
affairs. 
Part IV empirically demonstrates that statistical precedent can 
usefully estimate each decision’s degree of error and instability. I use 
 
 29. Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How 
Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 
422 (2013). 
 30. See id. at 414–20 (describing the judicial response to increasingly scarce resources). 
 31. See id. at 430–33. 
 32. For example, between 1995 and 2013, at least 40% of civil cases in the Ninth Circuit 
could have been decided differently if they had been assigned to one panel rather than another. 
Ryan Copus & Ryan Hübert, Detecting Inconsistency in Governance 5 (July 26, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2812914 [https://perma.cc/2M2X-VZXA]. 
 33. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at xii. 
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a dataset of Ninth Circuit civil decisions made between 1996 and 2010 
to build a model of the Ninth Circuit’s statistical precedent.34 I then 
use the model to estimate the degree of error and instability for each 
district court decision reviewed by the circuit court in 2011 and 2012 
and validate the estimates by testing them against traditional 
indicators of error and law development. A circuit court decision with 
a high estimated degree of error is significantly more likely to have a 
dissenting opinion, negative subsequent appellate history, and 
negative analysis in future opinions. Furthermore, opinions disposing 
of cases with a high estimated degree of instability are published more 
often and cited more frequently. In summary, as judged by judges, 
statistical precedent can accurately identify erroneous decisions and 
opportunities for developing law. 
Part V discusses the details of actually adopting a system of 
statistical precedent. In addition to elaborating on the set of reforms 
introduced above, I consider some of the core concerns with algorithm-
aided justice. These concerns, I argue, are largely evaded by using 
algorithms to allocate attention rather than to automate or 
recommend decisions on the merits. I also explain how courts can 
obtain the most useful summary of their statistical precedent and 
overcome concerns that the coders of statistical precedent might 
embed their own normative preferences and biases. The Article 
concludes with a brief discussion of political feasibility. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL PRECEDENT 
Both the basic process of mapping a court’s statistical 
precedent and its ability to help with everyday issues of judicial 
administration are intuitively accessible. Below, I describe the general 
idea of statistical precedent and, in order to help build a basic 
understanding, compare it to the traditional rule of precedent. 
A. Mapping a Court’s Statistical Precedent 
Imagine that a circuit court judge is worried about her court’s 
distribution of judicial attention. Though she generally trusts the 
considered judgment of her circuit court colleagues, she worries that 
judicial judgment, including hers, is too often ill-considered: judges 
 
 34. The dataset does not include administrative agency or habeas corpus cases. The 
variables include the nature of suit, whether the plaintiff has legal representation, identity of the 
district court and judge, the district court’s ABA rating, the outcome at the district court, the 
number of parties, and the number of major law firms. For more details on the dataset, see 
Copus & Hübert, supra note 32. 
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provide only cursory review of staff attorney decisions, spend little 
time thinking about those cases that they decide with unpublished 
opinions, rely heavily on law clerk bench memos, and are too often 
driven by ideological preconceptions and heuristics. They must 
sometimes err in their error correction. She is particularly concerned 
about improving in two domains. First, she is worried that she and her 
colleagues are not adequately reviewing recommendations by staff 
attorneys.35 Although she cannot possibly provide each of those 
decisions with a comprehensive assessment, can she somehow flag 
likely errors and make sure that she at least provides those cases with 
her focused attention? Second, she is concerned that she should be 
more active in monitoring panel decisions. While her circuit is large 
enough that judges have stopped precirculating their opinions to the 
full court, she would like to be aware of decisions that are particularly 
unusual. 
Perhaps her court’s historical decisions can provide insight. If 
the court has generally reversed a particular type of case, maybe a 
staff attorney’s or panel’s decision to affirm that type of case is a good 
candidate for her focused attention. She tests the idea out with one of 
her recent cases. She begins simply: she looks up the reversal rate for 
civil cases with a pro se plaintiff filed in the last ten years. Panels 
have reversed 16% of such cases, significantly higher than she would 
have thought. That’s useful information—she should probably be 
paying more attention to recommendations to affirm those cases. But 
the search seems too broad: she wants to know more about this 
particular type of case. She zeroes in: civil cases where there was a pro 
se plaintiff, a corporate defendant, federal question jurisdiction, 
decided on summary judgment, plaintiff prevailed, nature of suit is 
contract, decided by Judge Smith of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California on the report and recommendation of a 
Magistrate Judge Johnson, and the district court opinion was 
 
 35. Former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski nicely explains the concern:  
[T]he circuit shares approximately 70 staff attorneys, who process roughly 40 percent 
of the cases in which we issue a merits ruling. When I say process, I mean that they 
read the briefs, review the record, research the law, and prepare a proposed 
disposition, which they then present to a panel of three judges during a practice we 
call “oral screening”—oral, because the judges don’t see the briefs in advance, and 
because they generally rely on the staff attorney’s oral description of the case in 
deciding whether to sign on to the proposed disposition. After you decide a few dozen 
such cases on a screening calendar, your eyes glaze over, your mind wanders, and the 
urge to say O.K. to whatever is put in front of you becomes almost irresistible.  
Alex Kozinski, The Appearance of Propriety, LEGAL AFF. (Jan.–Feb. 2005), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/argument_kozinski_janfeb05.msp 
[https://perma.cc/NS45-FQM3].  
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published. No results. That was obviously too specific, so she deletes 
the search parameters for nature of suit and magistrate judge. Six 
cases match the less restrictive search, and the circuit court reversed 
four of them (66%). She suspects that the sample size is too small to 
trust. Published district court opinions are uncommon in pro se cases: 
maybe she can get a bigger sample by eliminating publication as a 
search parameter. She gets 231 results with twenty-one reversals 
(about 10%). But is that the best estimate? Is opinion publication an 
important correlate of reversal that this estimate ignores? Should she 
try additional searches? 
The judge is struggling to find the search query that optimizes 
the “bias-variance tradeoff.”36 Figure 1 helps to convey the concept. 
She wants a low bias, low variance estimate, as represented by the 
target in the upper left corner. Unfortunately, lower bias generally 
means higher variance, and lower variance generally means higher 
bias. Why? An unbiased estimate of a case’s chances of being reversed 
uses all information about that case—it aims for the center of the 
target. But by using all of the information, the number of comparable 
cases (i.e., cases with the same characteristics) dwindles, and any 
estimate based on such a small number of cases is likely to be 
unreliable—our dart player is aiming for the center, but she has a 
shaky (high variance) hand. By ignoring some characteristics about 
the case of interest, say by leaving the fact that the plaintiff prevailed 
out of the search query, we increase the number of cases we are basing 
an estimate on, but we move the aim away from the center of the 
target, towards cases where the plaintiff did not prevail. The dart 




 36. See Scott Fortmann-Roe, Understanding the Bias-Variance Tradeoff, SCOTT FORTMANN-
ROE (June 2012), http://scott.fortmann-roe.com/docs/BiasVariance.html [https://perma.cc/DH6Y-
EH8T]. 
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Variance can be a serious issue because it increases 
exponentially as more characteristics are added to the search. In a 
world with extensive electronic records, the list of available 
characteristics can be almost endless, so this “curse of dimensionality” 
can be a troublesome problem.38 For example, even with only ten 
dichotomous variables (e.g., decided by summary judgment or not, 
plaintiff prevailed or not, district court opinion published or not), there 
are 210 (or 1,024) different types of possible cases. Even with a 
moderately sized dataset of ten thousand, we’d expect only ten of each 
type of case. With such small sample sizes, estimates would have 
extremely high variance. 
Fortunately, we do not have to choose between adding a 
characteristic to the search inquiry or simply ignoring it. With 
techniques like multiple regression, we can partially add 
characteristics to the “search inquiry” (the quotes are now necessary 
because the partial addition of characteristics involves mathematical 
operations that are more sophisticated than a simple search inquiry, 
and we would be more accurate to now call it a statistical model). 
Rather than observing the reversal rate for the rare contracts case 
where the pro se plaintiff prevailed on summary judgment on the 
report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, we could instead 
start with the much more common civil case where the pro se plaintiff 
prevailed on summary judgment (contracts or not, on the report and 
 
 37. Id. at fig.1. 
 38. The phrase “curse of dimensionality,” widely used in statistical conversations, was 
coined in RICHARD BELLMAN, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING ix (2003). 
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recommendation of a magistrate judge or not). Worried that we have 
disregarded an important predictor of reversal (i.e., worried that we 
have taken on too much bias in the effort to reduce variance), we could 
try different methods of incorporating the case subject matter or 
magistrate judge as predictors. We might, for example, see how 
reports and recommendations of magistrate judges are associated with 
reversal rates for all cases and add that to our baseline estimate. Or 
perhaps we suspect that the association is unique for pro se civil cases, 
so we instead check how magistrate reports are associated with 
reversal for that subgroup of cases.   
The problem is now even starker: With all of the choices about 
which variables to add, which to add partially, and how to add them 
partially, how can we possibly figure out the “search query”—the 
statistical model—with the best mix of bias and variance? In other 
words, how do we find the dart player with the optimal combination of 
aim and steadiness? 
Machine learning provides a solution, effectively automating 
the process of creating statistical models and testing them for optimal 
accuracy. With a supply of predictor variables (e.g., nature of suit, 
prevailing party) and an outcome variable (e.g., reversal), we can let a 
machine train itself to identify which combinations of predictor 
variables are most helpful in predicting the outcome. Algorithms can 
learn from and adapt to the data, iteratively building models on 
subsets of data and testing themselves against different subsets to 
construct a predictive model. This is how the judge can find the best 
statistical answer to the question, “How often has the court reversed a 
case like this one?”39 It is how we can best identify a case’s statistical 
precedent. 
Imagine, then, that the judge has access to a model built with 
machine learning algorithms and the universe of the court’s decisions 
over the last five years. She enters all of the information for her case: 
in the last five years, her court has reversed 85% of similar cases. The 
staff attorney’s recommendation to affirm now looks suspicious, and 
maybe she should take a closer look at the briefs. But she is still 
struggling to understand the meaning—and value—of statistical 
precedent. An analogy to traditional precedent can help build more 
intuition. 
 
 39. It is important to understand that “like this one” will generally not be cognizable—it is 
unlikely to refer to a set of cases with the same set of characteristics (e.g., contract cases where 
the plaintiff won in the Northern District of California on a motion for summary judgment), 
because machine learning will draw on information from other categories of cases to generate 
more accurate predictions. 
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B. Traditional Versus Statistical Precedent 
The rule of traditional precedent, by which cases are resolved 
to conform to past decisions and, in turn, generate law to govern 
future cases, differs from statistical precedent in a number of obvious 
ways: traditional precedent is communicated in natural language, 
while statistical precedent is communicated in mathematical 
language; traditional precedent guides decisions on the merits, while I 
am arguing that statistical precedent should merely guide the 
focusing of attention on cases;40 and traditional precedent is, at least 
ideally, based on legally relevant factors, while statistical precedent 
utilizes both legally relevant and irrelevant factors in summarizing 
historical decisions. Despite these differences, statistical precedent 
largely serves the same ends as traditional precedent. And given 
heavy caseloads and large courts, I will argue that it can serve those 
ends more effectively while simultaneously restoring the waning 
power of traditional precedent. 
One standard justification for the traditional rule of precedent 
is that past decisions and reasoning embody a collective wisdom that 
an individual or small group of judges is unlikely to surpass. In this 
vein, Adrian Vermeule identifies four major theories: informational, 
evolutionary, traditional, and deliberative.41 He succinctly states the 
core of each theory: 
[T]he aggregate judgment of many might employ dispersed information better than the 
judgment of one; the judgments of many heads, over time, might weed out bad policies 
or institutions through an evolutionary process . . . tradition might embody the 
contributions of many minds; finally, deliberation and argument among the many might 
contribute diverse perspectives, resulting in better policies or institutions than any one 
could devise.42 
Whatever the merit of each individual theory, it is surely the 
case that previous decisions capture a valuable resource of collective 
wisdom. 
Statistical precedent also captures collective wisdom. It 
efficiently summarizes how a court has decided similar cases, allowing 
the court to identify and focus attention on decisions that most depart 
from its collective wisdom. Of course, unlike traditional precedent, it 
does not capture the reasoning of previous decisions—only the 
 
 40. While statistical precedent could theoretically provide guidance on the merits, there are 
serious problems with employing it in such a manner. See infra Section V.C (addressing various 
concerns with using statistical precedent). 
 41. See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 
4 (2009). 
 42. Id. 
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outcome of that reasoning. But that relative deficiency comes with 
extraordinary benefits. Statistical precedent can be communicated in 
one single, objective figure, thereby evading a key limitation of 
traditional precedent: the fact that different judges can interpret and 
apply the same precedent in different ways.43 By supplementing 
traditional precedent with statistical precedent, courts could add an 
objective indicator of a decision’s deviation from judges’ collective 
judgment. 
The rule of traditional precedent is also justified by an appeal 
to the value of legal certainty. As pithily expressed by Justice 
Brandeis, “[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable 
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”44 Thus, traditional 
precedent may be valuable even where collective wisdom is unwise. So 
too with statistical precedent, although in a less robust manner. 
Traditional precedent can be read and interpreted by businesses, 
organizations, and individuals as they try to plan their affairs and 
predict the outcomes of hypothetical or actual litigation. Statistical 
precedent is less valuable to noncourt actors. The problem is in the 
mismatch between the cases that form the basis of statistical 
precedent—those cases that make it into the appellate court—and the 
much larger set of cases that people want guidance on. Statistical 
precedent can accurately model the former but not the latter. 
Combined with the fact that it does not include the reasons for an 
outcome, statistical precedent would thus likely be of little direct use 
to potential litigants in evaluating the merits of their case. 
Nonetheless, insofar as statistical precedent helps the courts attend to 
and correct the decisions that depart furthest from its collective 
practices (including the practice of deferring to traditional precedent), 
it can promote consistent and predictable decisionmaking. 
Traditional precedent also aids in assuring that like cases are 
treated alike. Similarly, statistical precedent, which allows a court to 
locate and funnel attention to the cases that have not been treated like 
similar cases, can help make sure that a court abides by the 
fundamental tenant of equality.45 
 
 43. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950) (“[S]ince there 
is always more than one available correct answer [to a disputed issue of law], the court always 
has to select.”).  
 44. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932), overruled in part by 
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). 
 45. For the moment, I am minimizing a complication to this claim. Traditional precedent 
promises to assure equal treatment for cases whose facts are similar in legally relevant ways. 
The conception of “similarity” implied by statistical precedent is, at least as a technical matter, 
agnostic to the distinction between legally relevant and irrelevant facts. Statistical precedent 
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Finally, traditional precedent helps the court preserve 
resources. Justice Cardozo, for example, justified the rule of precedent 
on the grounds that “the labor of judges would be increased almost to 
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every 
case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure 
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.”46 
One could say something similar of judicial attention and statistical 
precedent in the modern courts: without the ability to rely on the 
information embedded in datasets of past decisions, judges could not 
hope to find the current decisions that most need their attention. 
Of course, the extent to which traditional precedent actually 
serves the above goals is a contentious issue. Advocates of the 
indeterminacy thesis doubt that precedent can meaningfully constrain 
decisions.47 Political scientists have produced an essentially 
uncountable number of studies purporting to show the dominant 
influence of political ideology on judicial decisionmaking.48 And there 
is no shortage of objections to those critiques of precedent.49  
Whatever success traditional precedent has had in allowing 
judges to coordinate across time and cases to promote collective 
wisdom, legal certainty, equality, and efficiency, it is struggling under 
modern conditions. The simple evidence of that fact is that courts have 
all but stopped using it: as noted above, less than 10% of decisions now 
establish precedent.50 The most obvious reason for the retreat from 
 
merely summarizes the collective decisions of a court. Thus, if a court has been responsive to 
legally irrelevant case facts, statistical precedent will also tend to be responsive to those facts. In 
short, if a court’s shared conception of error is faulty, statistical precedent will reflect that fault. 
In Section III.A, I argue that attention must be distributed according to some conception of error, 
and that whatever its faults, a court’s collective conception of error is our best option. 
Furthermore, in Section V.C, I explain that because I am arguing that statistical precedent 
should only be used to allocate attention—not to automate or recommend decisions—this largely 
mitigates the concern that algorithms would cement historical faults into the justice system.  
 46. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1st ed. 1921). 
 47. For an extended discussion of the indeterminacy thesis, see Lawrence B. Solum, On the 
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
 48. For an overview of research into extra-legal influences on judging, see Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on 
Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 203 (2017).  
 49. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 
(2009). 
 50. See Table B-12: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Type of Opinion or Order Filed in Cases 
Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2017, 
supra note 9 (revealing that nearly 90% of decisions are now made in nonprecedential opinions). 
Although courts have dramatically reduced the production of formal legal precedent, there are 
arguments that nonpublished opinions create a body of informal precedent. Lauren Robel, The 
Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an 
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 401 (2002).   
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precedent is that judges simply do not have the time to carefully 
construct opinions fit for publication: traditional precedent is a victim 
of the courts’ need to triage.51 But there are many other likely reasons 
that traditional precedent is becoming so rare. A high rate of opinion 
publication might “add[ ] to the clutter, and sometimes confusion, of 
our multitudinous array of published decisions.”52 The increase in the 
number of judges may also make precedent collectively less 
intelligible: if court-developed law is Ronald Dworkin’s chain novel,53 
then when written in a large court, it is a novel written by a 
cacophonous collection of authors.54 Moreover, many of the cases that 
make up the modern courts’ dockets—such as those reviewing social 
security or immigration decisions—may involve the type of bulk, fact-
intensive areas of law that are particularly resistant to the 
constraining forces of precedent.55  
Statistical precedent, in contrast, thrives under modern 
conditions. Because there are more judges contributing to a court’s 
body of decisions, it can draw on a more diverse collection of 
viewpoints that strengthen the collective wisdom embedded in a 
court’s decisions. And because there are more decisions, statistical 
precedent can more accurately track that wisdom: a larger dataset 
allows machine learning to dig deeper into the statistical connections 
between case variables and case outcomes. Statistical precedent is also 
robust to the fact-intensive areas of law that may make traditional 
 
 51. See Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 
51 FED. LAW 36, 38 (2004) (“[T]he process of anticipating how the language of the disposition will 
be read by future litigants and courts, and how small variations in wording might be imbued 
with meanings never intended—takes exponentially more time and must be reserved, given our 
caseload, to the cases we designate for publication.”). 
 52. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 197 
(1999). 
 53. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–38 (1986) (comparing the interpretive 
processes of law and literature through the invented genre of “chain novel”). 
 54. See Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 58 (2002) 
(statement of Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) (“We 
want to speak clearly through . . . published opinions. And given that we have over two dozen 
judges doing the speaking, plus 10 senior judges, plus visiting judges, you can actually get quite 
a cacophony going . . . .”).  
 55. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus 
Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 293 (2006):  
The larger the body of law and the more fact-intensive the inquiry, identifying all or 
even most relevant factually analogous cases becomes difficult or impossible. With a 
mass of precedent from which to choose, judges may well “decid[e] intuitively . . . what 
is the right result and then scour[ ] legal texts for the [precedent] that will justify the 
intuition.” 
(alterations in original) (quoting John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal 
Certainty, 27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, 63 n.61 (2002)). 
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precedent less effective. Because statistical precedent merely 
summarizes outcomes rather than the reasoning process by which 
those outcomes are justified, it is as much at home with standards as 
it is with rules. 
Importantly, statistical precedent can also help strengthen 
traditional precedent. If time pressures and the deleterious effects of a 
cluttered jurisprudence keep judges from producing precedent at a 
high rate, they need to make sure that their law-developing efforts are 
spent wisely. And statistical precedent can alert courts to the cases 
whose outcomes are most unpredictable and, thus, likely most 
underdetermined by existing law.56 
Although I hope the comparison to traditional precedent is 
usefully intuitive, a conceptual framework is needed to fully 
understand statistical precedent and how it can be crafted to best 
serve the administration of justice. Part II reviews the existing 
“resource allocation framework” for assessing the distribution of 
judicial attention, and Part III expands that framework so that we can 
better understand what statistical precedent can offer courts. 
II. THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK  
How should courts allocate their limited attention? Marin Levy 
has provided the most ambitious answer to that question, and her 
answer provides the basis for mine.57 In this Part, I summarize her 
application of the resource allocation framework to the issue of judicial 
attention. But I also argue that the framework is limited by an overly 
formalistic treatment of “error” and that we should move from a case-
based to decision-based framework. 
A. The Basics 
Most scholarly literature on the triaging of judicial attention 
has criticized what William Richman and William Reynolds termed a 
“Two-Track” system of justice: powerful litigants can expect their 
arguments to be heard, considered, and resolved by Article III judges, 
while the claims of powerless litigants will be resolved on the briefs by 
a staff attorney, getting only cursory review by actual judges.58 These 
 
 56. See infra Section III.B (discussing how relative degrees of instability can signal areas 
where the law needs further development).  
 57. Levy, supra note 29. 
 58. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at xii. 
Copus_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2020  1:03 PM 
624 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:3:605 
“separate and unequal” tracks of justice are undoubtedly troubling.59 
And for many scholars, the answer is to end the need for triage: either 
increase the number of judges60 or limit the number of cases61 so the 
court can provide full judicial attention to each case.  
But Levy asks us to be “realists.”62 Congress is unlikely to 
either radically increase the courts’ supply of judicial attention or to 
decrease the demand for judicial attention. Scholars, therefore, need 
to start addressing whether and how courts can do better with their 
limited resources. In brief, how can the court use its main input—
judicial attention—to maximize its two main outputs—error correction 
and law development?63 
With respect to a court’s error-correcting function, Levy 
proposes that courts conserve judicial attention when a case is likely 
to be decided correctly without it.64 She proposes two categories of 
cases that would be likely to satisfy this criteria: “(1) those that are 
most likely to be reviewed effectively through a nonargument review 
process and (2) those that are least likely to have errors upon arrival 
at the appellate courts.”65 
In the first category, she proposes, are those cases that raise 
issues that the court repeatedly confronts.66 As courts (including staff 
attorneys) become more familiar with the complexities of an issue, it 
should be easier for them to identify errors, and there should thus be 
little need for judicial attention.67 As an example, she offers appeals 
from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying an asylum 
application.68 Some circuits decide hundreds of such appeals annually, 
and most of the appeals involve the same issue: “[W]hether an adverse 
credibility finding by the BIA is supported by substantial evidence.”69 
For the second category of cases—those that are least likely to 
have errors—she proposes two promising subcategories.70 First, 
 
 59. David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over 
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1668 (2005). 
 60. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 61. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
19–20 (Dec. 1995), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourtslongrangeplan_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SXH5-L5KD]. 
 62. Levy, supra note 29, at 401. 
 63. See id. at 424–25.  
 64. See id. at 431. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 431–32. 
 69. Id. at 432. 
 70. See id. 
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district courts are unlikely to have made errors in deciding frivolous 
appeals, such as those from tax protestors.71 Second, cases that have 
already undergone a “meaningful layer of review” should be less likely 
to arrive in the appellate courts with error.72 For example, she 
theorizes that Social Security cases should rarely contain a material 
error because they have already been reviewed by an administrative 
law judge, the Social Security Administration Appeals Council 
(“SSAAC”), and a district court before arriving in the appellate court.73 
And which appeals are least likely to be important for 
advancing the court’s law-development goals? Levy argues that they 
are largely the same cases that need the least error-correcting 
attention: frivolous appeals and those that repeatedly involve the 
same core issues (e.g., asylum applications), which are unlikely to 
need clarification of the law.74 
Taking stock of the courts’ current practices, Levy provides a 
preliminary defense: they seem to be placing the right cases in the 
low-attention track.75 But she also stresses the tentative nature of her 
defense.76 Perhaps the courts are depriving the wrong cases of 
attention. How could they know? She recommends that courts 
randomly select some of the appeals that are currently receiving 
limited judicial attention and provide them with more attention (e.g., 
assign them to chambers or track them for oral argument).77 If the 
publication and reversal rates of those randomly selected cases turned 
out to be significantly higher than the cases that were not selected, it 
would provide evidence that the court’s triage system was 
malfunctioning.78 
In summary, Levy argues that judges should allocate more 
attention to cases that are likely to be erroneously decided without it. 
While her framework serves as the conceptual foundation for my 
paper, it leaves two core issues underdeveloped: What does it mean for 
decisions to be in “error,” and how can courts actually find them? 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 433. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. at 435. 
 76. See id. at 439. 
 77. See id. at 441. 
 78. Id. at 441–42. 
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B. The Limitations 
“Error” is contested: judges disagree with other judges. 
Sometimes this disagreement is readily apparent, such as when a 
judge issues a dissenting opinion or a court reverses a panel decision 
in an en banc proceeding. But empirical research shows that judicial 
disagreement is far more prevalent than dissents or en banc decisions 
would suggest. Because cases are randomly assigned to panels, 
researchers can show that some types of panels systematically reach 
different outcomes than other types of panels. And the rate of 
disagreement can be striking. Cass Sunstein and coauthors found, for 
example, that a panel of three judges all appointed by a Democratic 
president is 86% more likely to decide in favor of the plaintiff in a gay 
rights case than a panel of all Republican appointees, 49% more likely 
to decide in favor of an affirmative action plan, and 46% more likely to 
decide for the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case.79 And such high 
rates of inconsistency are not limited to politically salient issues: at 
least 40% of all civil cases in the Ninth Circuit could be decided 
differently based on panel assignment.80 
The fact that judges disagree over whether a decision is in 
error poses challenges to Levy’s framework. By whose conception of 
error should courts allocate attention? If she means that courts should 
limit their judicial attention when all of its panels would agree, the 
framework is a poor match for the scope of the problem. For example, 
it would provide little guidance for identifying which 10% of opinions 
should be published unless—implausibly—panels were in complete 
consensus in 90% of cases. And which 20% of cases should be tracked 
for oral argument? The courts resources are so constrained that they 
do not just need to know which cases they can safely pay less attention 
to—they also need to know which cases are especially in need of 
attention. 
The first step in making the framework viable is choosing 
between two plausible options: courts could either allocate attention 
according to each panel’s conception of error or according to some 
collective, court conception of error. Theoretically, panel-centric and 
court-centric conceptions could lead to vastly different allocations of 
judicial attention. Consider, for example, the assignment of cases to 
staff attorneys. Perhaps there are some lower court decisions that 10% 
of panels would reverse and that 90% of panels would affirm. 
 
 79. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 20 tbl.2-1 (2007). 
 80. Copus & Hübert, supra note 32, at 18. The results exclude habeas and agency review. 
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Assuming that staff attorneys generally share the views of the 
collective court, staff attorneys would likely draft an opinion to affirm 
the case.81 Under a panel-centric allocation scheme, these cases should 
be assigned to judicial chambers for 10% of panels and to staff 
attorneys for 90% of panels. But under a court-centric scheme, the 
cases would be assigned to staff attorneys regardless of which panel 
was assigned to the case.  
The distinction might seem to be of mere theoretical interest, 
but it points to a second limitation: conceptual analysis can only 
provide a rough approximation of the decisions that need judicial 
attention. For example, Levy argues that cases that have already been 
meaningfully reviewed for error before they reach the appellate court, 
such as Social Security appeals, are good candidates for less 
attention.82 This again belies an overly formalist view of error—might 
the circuit court’s conception of error differ from the administrative 
law judge’s, the SSAAC’s, and the district court judge’s conception of 
error? And even if most social security appeals do not need judicial 
attention, might there be some that do? 
The rough results of conceptual analysis also obscure the 
possibility for allocating attention in a multistage process. For 
example, perhaps, as Levy argues, it is true that asylum appeals are 
likely to be decided correctly by staff attorneys because they 
repeatedly raise the same legal issues.83 Nonetheless, staff attorneys 
might still make mistakes in some cases, and conceptual analysis does 
little to help us identify those mistakes. With more precise estimates 
of the “correct” decision, judges could allocate their attention to 
reviewing the most at-risk staff attorney opinions. 
Levy’s implicit assumption that judges are in consensus as to 
error further masks the fact that judicial attention also needs to be 
allocated to the work of other judges in order to correct the courts’ own 
 
 81. Cf. Richard Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on 
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 775 (1983): 
Because the staff attorney is not selected by the individual judge, he owes his loyalty 
to the court as a whole (perhaps too indistinct an entity to command much loyalty), 
rather than to the individual judge to whom he is from time to time assigned. There 
can be no assurance that the staff attorney will share the outlook and values of that 
judge, and he will not have a chance to acquire that outlook and those values, or at 
least understand them sympathetically, by working intimately with the same judge 
over a period of months or years. For these reasons the staff attorney will ordinarily 
be less able to function effectively as a judge’s alter ego . . . .  
 82. See Levy, supra note 29, at 433.  
 83. See id. at 431–32.  
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errors and aid the development of a coherent and lucid body of law.84 
Most obviously, a circuit court can allocate attention by evaluating a 
case for en banc review, and, perhaps, actually taking the case en 
banc. But other forms of judicial attention might also help correct a 
circuit court error. For example, some courts make drafts of opinions 
available to the entire court, providing an opportunity for off-panel 
judges to provide feedback.85 How should a court allocate these forms 
of attention? The next Part enriches the resource allocation 
framework to remedy these limitations and make room for 
understanding the role that statistical precedent can play. 
III. EXPANDING THE FRAMEWORK: ERROR AND INSTABILITY 
I adopt the basics of Marin Levy’s resource allocation 
framework, but I set out more explicit targets for advancing the 
court’s core functions. I argue that a court can generally promote its 
error-correcting function by focusing attention on decisions with a 
high degree of error, and that a court can generally promote its law-
developing function by focusing on decisions with a high degree of 
instability. 
A. The Degree of Error 
It may seem awkward to speak of decisions having “degrees” of 
error, but I do not think it should. Assessing error can be a difficult 
task. In deciding whether a decision should be reversed, a judge might 
consider precedent, statutes, legislative history, policy, values, and 
 
 84. The U.S. Courts of Appeals have played a critical role in maintaining quality, 
predictability, and consistency of decisionmaking in the relatively decentralized and high-volume 
federal district courts. But as the circuit courts have themselves transformed into behemoth 
systems of adjudication, a question presents itself: Who will correct the circuit courts’ errors? The 
Supreme Court confesses to have relinquished the job. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections 
on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 
92 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court “is not a court of error correction”). But by strategically 
allocating judicial attention, the courts of appeals could serve as robust correctors of their own 
errors. 
 85. See, e.g., Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1479, 1490 (2012) (“Not infrequently, an off-panel judge will circulate a memorandum to the 
panel identifying what that judge views as an error in the panel’s opinion and suggesting 
revisions.”). But judges might also have to choose which panel opinions to even look at. Id. at 
1490 n.49:  
In some circuits, draft opinions are circulated to the entire court before they are 
published. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). The Ninth Circuit does not adhere to this 
practice because of our size. We do, however, precirculate summaries of opinions, and 
we are quite receptive to altering opinions after publication based on feedback from 
our colleagues. 
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how the decision might fit with future decisions of the court—and a 
judge might also consider whether or how much each of these should 
even be considered. We should thus not naively treat error as 
dichotomous: any assessment that a decision is in error is, or at least 
should be, implicitly accompanied by a degree of certainty with respect 
to that assessment. And we are rarely, if ever, completely certain that 
a decision should or should not be reversed. If prompted to think about 
our assessment that a particular case should be reversed, we may, for 
example, admit to lingering doubts about the scope of our legal 
research, the strength of the policy analysis, the propriety of 
consulting legislative history, or even the wisdom of our motivating 
values. Thus, after reflection, we might think that a decision is more 
or less in error. Though our legal systems may often operate on ones 
and zeroes, we should be honest and humble enough to admit that our 
assessments do not. To speak more honestly, it is better to say that 
the court’s error-correcting function is about making sure decisions 
that are more in error are reversed. 
While individuals can make their own degreed assessments of 
error, how should a court, as a collective entity that must allocate 
attention to correcting errors, make assessments? My argument is 
that it should try to aggregate the assessments of its panels. More 
specifically, I define a lower court or agency decision’s degree of error 
as the percentage of all possible panel combinations that would 
reverse a decision if they were to carefully evaluate it.86 Importantly, 
any decision by a circuit court (e.g., by a staff attorney, law clerk, or 
panel) also has a degree of error. If the circuit court decision is to 
affirm, its degree of error is the same as the lower court or agency 
decision. If the decision is to reverse, the degree of error is the 
opposite. For example, if a staff attorney’s opinion recommends 
reversing a lower court decision that has a 20% degree of error, the 
staff attorney opinion has an 80% degree of error. 
This conception of error has a number of appealing normative 
features. The first is epistemic. Tying it to collective judicial judgment 
leverages the wisdom of a wise crowd.87 Federal circuit court judges 
 
 86. An even better definition would aggregate each individual panel’s degreed assessment 
of error. But the ultimate goal will be to estimate the hypothetical decisions, and panels do not 
provide their degreed assessments in the real world—they either disturb a lower court decision 
or affirm it. I thus settle for the current definition, which, I will argue, can plausibly be 
estimated. 
 87. There are multiple ways to understand the epistemic benefit. For one, if we assume that 
each panel is better than a coin flip at correctly deciding cases, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem shows 
that the probability of getting the correct answer increases with the number of votes. Here, I 
invoke the polling model of the theorem, as described by Paul H. Edelman. Paul H. Edelman, On 
Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 333 (2002).  
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are among the most respected jurists in the nation and, as designated 
experts in law, their collective assessment merits substantial 
epistemic deference.88 
A second benefit of tying the degree of error to the judgment of 
circuit court judges is democratic legitimacy.89 Federal circuit court 
judges, of course, are nominated by the president and confirmed by 
the senate. Thus, even where we strongly disagree with the collective 
judgment of circuit court judges in some areas of law, our 
disagreement does not have the same stamp of institutional 
legitimacy. Efforts to promote a court’s error-correcting function 
should focus on judicial conceptions of error. We may strive to change 
a court’s judgment, either through arguments directed at its existing 
members or through efforts to have judges appointed whose 
assessments of error better match our own, but we should hesitate to 
undermine (or prevent improvements in) a court’s error-correcting 
function merely because we disagree with its conception of error. 
To the extent that one is unpersuaded by the epistemic or 
legitimacy benefits of a court-centric definition of error, its potential 
for reducing inconsistency in decisionmaking may warrant deference. 
Inconsistent decisionmaking, whether due to the idiosyncrasies of 
different panels’ judgments90 or simple panel oversights,91 undermines 
 
 88. I do not want to shy away from the claim that collective judicial judgment is, on 
average, superior to an individual panel’s judgment. While I discuss other benefits of focusing 
judicial attention on the decisions that the highest percentage of panels would reverse, statistical 
precedent loses much of its appeal if one is not convinced that a high level of judicial support for 
reversal is a good indication that a decision should be reversed. Curiously, there seems to be a 
tendency to mentally foreground those imagined situations where our own judgments are in the 
minority. For example, we readily imagine those situations where most judges would decide 
against (or in favor) of a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit, but where we would 
bravely and wisely rule in favor of (or against) the plaintiff. Why should our brave and wise 
decision be subject to extra judicial scrutiny!? But for most of us, most of the time (and for most 
actual judges, most of the time), the much more realistic concern is that a miscarriage of justice 
escapes notice. 
 89. See Michael B. Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (2000): 
Just as we structure legislatures around majoritarian principles, so too, I will argue, 
should we seek to ensure that when a panel reaches a decision, it is the decision that a 
majority of all judges on the courts of appeals would reach if given adequate time to 
consider the issue. A decision is thus “correct” if it is the hypothetical majoritarian 
one.  
(footnote omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., Kleinfeld Statement, supra note 17, at 7: 
No district judge and no lawyer can, by reading even a few hundred of our decisions, 
predict what our court will do in the next case. Even if the decisions could be read, 
there are over 3,000 combinations of judges who may wind up on panels, so the 
exercise would not be worth the time. At best, the bar can predict that we will restate 
our clear holdings as controlling law, though different panels may apply the same 
holdings to similar facts in different ways. The disparateness will naturally be higher 
in unpublished dispositions. 
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the ability of lower courts, litigants, businesses, and individuals to 
predict and comply with legal requirements. Focusing judicial 
attention according to a collective conception of error—even if that 
conception is flawed—can help a court reduce inconsistency and 
promote predictability.  
Dissemination of decisions’ degrees of error could also increase 
a court’s total supply of judicial attention by increasing the expected 
benefit of extra judicial effort. Consider, for example, a judge who 
wishes to be more active in the court’s error-correcting role. She has 
thought about trying to review more of the staff attorney drafts as 
well as some of her colleagues’ drafts.92 But the universe of options is 
overwhelming, and she figures that she would be wasting her time if 
she simply selected opinions to review at random. She might thus 
choose to proceed as normal, quickly checking the staff-attorney drafts 
that are her official responsibility and paying attention only to her 
assigned panel’s cases. But if she had access to cases’ degrees of error 
and could thus readily identify a subset of more troublesome decisions, 
she might decide to invest the additional effort. 
While I propose that a court should generally focus judicial 
attention on decisions with higher degrees of error if the court’s goal is 
to promote error correction, a higher degree of error may not always 
be a good target for judicial attention. Cases with an extremely high 
degree of error may not—at least immediately—warrant judicial 
attention. For example, while a court could allocate attention to make 
sure that a lower court decision with a 95% degree of error is reversed, 
staff attorneys would also likely reverse such an “easy” case. It could 
thus make sense to assign the case to a staff attorney. But the general 
rule that judicial attention should be allocated to decisions with high 
degrees of error would immediately come back into play if the drafted 
opinion unexpectedly recommended affirming the lower court decision: 
 
 91. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 13, at 1130–37 (providing evidence that the Second and 
Ninth Circuits reduced their reversal rates in civil cases once they were overwhelmed by 
immigration appeals). 
 92. See Berzon, supra note 85, at 1490 (“Not infrequently, an off-panel judge will circulate a 
memorandum to the panel identifying what that judge views as an error in the panel’s opinion 
and suggesting revisions.”). At least without the aid of statistical precedent, many courts can do 
little to review panel opinions. Id. at 1490 n.49. Commentators have stressed the importance of 
cross-panel sharing and feedback. Robert A. Leflar recommends that opinions  
be circulated to all the judges on the entire court under an arrangement by which 
other judges may within a specified short time report their objections to it with 
requests that the original panel reconsider its position. The panel would not be bound 
to do so, but could. This arrangement at least would give all the judges some 
opportunity for input into the original panel’s ultimately authoritative precedential 
decision. 
 Robert A. Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722, 729–30 (1983).  
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the panel should prioritize and intensely review a staff attorney 
decision with such a high degree of error. 
The degree of error may also be an imperfect target for judicial 
attention insofar as it does not track the importance of an error. For 
example, the lower court’s decision in a small contractual dispute may 
have a 70% degree of error while another district court’s decision in a 
large contractual dispute may have only a 60% degree of error. One 
could reasonably believe that a court’s error-correcting function is 
better served by targeting judicial attention at the large contractual 
dispute even though it has a lower degree of error. Or perhaps a 
district court decision has a lower degree of error than another, but 
the former decision made multiple errors while the latter made only 
one. One might again reasonably believe that it is more important to 
correct the decision with more errors. But there is little reason to 
think that the possible disconnects between the degree of error and its 
importance would be systematic (i.e., degree and importance of error 
are unlikely to be negatively correlated), so degree of error would still, 
on average, provide a good target for judicial attention if the court’s 
goal is error correction.93   
B. The Degree of Instability 
Like error, the judicial development of law is the subject of 
contentious debates. Should courts develop law with small, 
incremental steps, or should their judicial opinions provide broad 
guidance in an effort to resolve issues beyond those that are 
immediately presented by the case under consideration? Should they 
incorporate policy analysis into the law? Should they promote 
standards or rules? We can skip these questions, as there is little need 
 
 93. Note that I make no claim about how high a decision’s degree of error must be to 
warrant the court allocating attention to it in order to correct the error. For example, 
attentiveness to decisions with less than a 50% degree of error may promote error correction 
despite the fact that most panels would not believe the decision should be reversed. In fact, it is 
even possible that there is no lower court decision that a majority of panels would assess as in 
error. There may nonetheless be reasons that the court should continue to reverse cases with a 
higher degree of error. For one, the possibility of reversal could be important for incentivizing 
district court judges and agencies to do better: even if most panels would not reverse a particular 
decision, it is possible that the district judge or agency could have decided the case such that an 
even larger percentage of panels would favor affirming. For example, instead of resolving the 
case on a motion to dismiss, the district court judge could have permitted discovery and resolved 
the case on a motion for summary judgment instead, perhaps satisfying even more panels’ 
notions of justice. See Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High 
Volume Agency Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2018) (arguing that judicial review of 
agency decisions can help agencies identify and fix systematic problems). Regardless, the issue is 
largely academic. The ultimate goal will be to estimate each decision’s degree of error, and 
estimates will be not be sufficiently precise to support a debate on such a fine-tuned issue. 
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to weigh in on how the law should be developed in order to suggest 
where it should be developed. And on this issue, courts already provide 
guidance in their rules on opinion publication. If, according to those 
rules, judges should develop law where the resolution of a case 
“establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law,”94 
then it stands to reason that a court can promote its law-developing 
function by directing judicial attention toward cases where the 
relevant law is most in need of being established, altered, modified, 
clarified, or explained. 
I propose that judges should seek to make these adjustments to 
law in cases where judicial assessments of error are most likely to 
conflict. If the current state of the law is insufficient to generate 
consensus among judges as to the correct outcome in a case, it is a 
good indication that the law needs development: lower court judges, 
litigants, businesses, and individuals are also likely to be confused as 
to what the law requires of them. More specifically, I propose that a 
court can promote its law-developing function by focusing attention on 
the cases with a high degree of instability, defined as the percentage of 
all possible panel combinations whose decisions would conflict with 
the majority of hypothetical panel decisions.95 Thus, the degree of 
instability is maximized at 50%, where 50% of panels would reverse 
and 50% of panels would affirm a case. In contrast, if 80% of 
hypothetical panels would decide a case in a given way, the degree of 
instability is only 20%. 
Of course, a higher degree of instability may not always 
represent a better opportunity for developing law. First, the degree of 
instability is not necessarily related to its importance. For example, 
even if judges widely disagree over the outcome of a case, the case’s 
fact patterns may be so far removed from any that are likely to occur 
in the future that development of the law would have little practical 
effect. Or a case may be of such public importance that it should be 
decided in a published opinion regardless of its contribution to law.96 
But there is little reason to believe that the degree and importance of 
instability systematically conflict, so instability should still, on 
average, provide a good target for the development of law. 
 
 94. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a). 
 95. The term “instability” may seem like an odd choice over more natural words like 
“disagreement,” “dissension,” or “conflict.” But terms like “disagreement” suggest that panels 
openly reach conflicting decisions. “Instability” is meant to stress the extent to which 
assessments may fluctuate with different panels, whether panels are aware of that fact or not. 
 96. Indeed, circuit publication rules generally include a provision addressing public 
importance. See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(d) (requiring publication if the disposition involves “a legal 
or factual issue of unique interest or substantial public importance”). 
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Second, instability may be more or less remediable. For 
example, in some cases, curing instability might require addressing so 
much complexity that the attempt to develop law would likely muddy 
the waters. Or there may be wisdom in allowing legal issues to 
percolate and develop in the district courts rather than jumping at the 
first chance to resolve an unfamiliar issue,97 especially if the panel 
lacks expertise in the area.98 Alternatively, issues in an unstable case 
may be so intensely contested that any attempt to provide clarity 
would fail to build judicial consensus, engendering more or less veiled 
defiance of precedent instead. And, unlike the importance of 
instability, there are a priori reasons to think that remediability and 
degree of instability are negatively correlated: complexity, 
unfamiliarity, and intensity of disagreement may all be causes of 
existing instability.99 Nonetheless, whether judges choose to resolve 
instability or not, they should at least be aware of it.100 Knowledge of 
its existence and the presumed toll it takes on those who must plan 
affairs in law’s shifting shadow should inspire judges to more deeply 
reflect and communicate in an earnest search for a way forward.101  
 
 97. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 915 
(2006) (discussing the possibility of “delaying the very process of rulemaking until enough cases 
arose such that the rulemaking body could have the benefit of having seen multiple examples of 
some larger problem”). 
 98. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 548–50 
(2008) (discussing benefits of subject-matter specialization in opinion authorship). 
 99. It is not difficult to imagine ways that complexity, unfamiliarity, and intensity of 
disagreement could each be a cause of instability. For example, in factually complex areas of law, 
where unique fact patterns can be difficult to account for ex ante, decisionmaking may be 
resistant to the constraints of rule-based precedent. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 (1992). Thus, high instability may exist 
because factual complexity prevents the development of precedent that could reliably constrain 
judges. Unfamiliarity may cause instability because ideology may fill gaps where data is sparse, 
and allowing district courts to assess and develop arguments could help promote consensus at 
the circuit level. Finally, intensity of disagreement may have caused judges to avoid clarifying 
law in the past such that those intense disagreements remain unresolved. 
 100. Consider, for example, possible ways forward in the face of high complexity. If factual 
complexity is the cause of high instability in a set of cases, it may indicate that the court should 
establish a different level of deference. If reversal is little more than a coin flip, it is not clear 
that circuit court review is accomplishing much. Reducing or increasing deference could help 
bring judges to the same page. 
 101. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or 
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 785 (1983): 
As it is now, except with each panel, judges learn of each others’ views only through 
circulated written opinions which, in the court’s pressured work environment, often 
gain more dust than readership. It might make sense for the judges of the court to 
meet occasionally to discuss areas of law in the circuit that may need clarification, or 
have been left a bit murky. The purpose of sharing views on such topics would not be 
to establish a fixed agenda for action and definitely not to decide abstract issues. 
Rather, its purpose would be to make us more sensitive to our colleagues’ interests 
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Note that instability is a simple function of error, as illustrated 
in Figure 2. At low degrees of error, the values increase together, but 
they diverge from one another at high degrees of error. We can think 
of decisions with either extremely high or low error as the “easy” 
decisions—essentially all panels agree on what the correct outcome 
is.102 Decisions with extremely low degrees of error are easily 
identifiable affirmances, and decisions with extremely high error are 
easily identifiable reversals. Judges are unlikely to find good 
opportunities for developing law at either end: if precedent is meant to 
build predictability in legal systems, there is little room for creating 
that predictability where it already exists.103 But, of course, this 
means that the general rules I have suggested—that courts focus 
attention on decisions with a high degree of error to promote error 
correction and focus attention on decisions with a high degree of 
instability to promote law development—can be in tension with one 
another. 
 




Though the tension between the court’s error-correcting and 
law-developing functions is real, it can be alleviated by a multistage 
 
and views, and perhaps to establish a general aura of agreement on our responsibility, 
as a court, to identify and to elucidate particular subjects. 
 102. This Article does not engage with the indeterminacy thesis. An “easy” case, used in the 
sense here, may still be legally indeterminate according to some conceptions of the law. For 
example, judges might generally agree on the outcome of a case due to widely shared policy 
views—views that might not count as “legal” sources according to some philosophies. 
 103. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597–98 (1987) (“The most 
commonly offered of the substantive reasons for choosing strong over weak precedential 
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approach to allocating attention.104 Judges need not initially allocate 
their attention to reviewing lower court decisions that have an 
extremely high degree of error—they can conserve their attention by 
letting staff attorneys or law clerks make a first effort, waiting to 
allocate their attention and review the decisions that do not reverse 
those cases. Of course, the review of those high-error staff attorney or 
law clerk drafts for error would not tend to promote law development, 
but we should expect such errors to be rare. 
With the conceptual framework in place, we are now in position 
to understand the value of statistical precedent. It is a way to estimate 
each case’s degree of error and instability. Although necessarily based 
on datasets of historical decisions, it can be used to solve a problem of 
prediction: How would the court’s current judges, as a collective, apply 
existing law to resolve each case? As I show in the next Part, 
statistical precedent is surprisingly effective at doing so. 
IV. AN ILLUSTRATION:  
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S STATISTICAL PRECEDENT 
In order to demonstrate the ability of statistical precedent to 
usefully predict the degree of error and instability of future decisions, 
this Part uses the Ninth Circuit’s statistical precedent between 1996 
and 2010 (the training set, with 16,357 observations) in order to 
estimate the degree of error and instability for each lower court and 
panel decision in 2011 and 2012 (the test set, with 1,890 observations). 
I then show that the panel decisions with higher degrees of error were 
indeed more likely to be accompanied by traditional indicators of 
error: they were more frequently accompanied by dissents, had more 
subsequent negative appellate history, and were more frequently 
subject to negative analysis in future opinions. Higher instability 
estimates were also associated with law development: cases with 
higher instability were more frequently published, and published 
decisions with higher instability were cited more frequently. 
 
 104. Here, I focus on possible divergences between the decisions in error and the those that 
provide good opportunities for developing law. A court’s error-correcting and law-developing 
goals could be in tension even where the decisions completely overlap (e.g., where there are no 
cases with greater than 50% degree of error), simply because time spent developing law is time 
not correcting errors (and vice versa). We could, for example, imagine a court purely dedicated to 
quickly correcting as many errors as possible and never authoring precedential opinions. 
Alternatively, we could imagine a court dedicated to writing comprehensive and high-quality 
opinions in only the most important cases. I do not address the relative importance of error 
correction as opposed to law development, as judges undoubtedly have more informed views than 
I do about the issue. My argument is that whatever split judges choose, knowledge regarding 
cases’ error and instability would be instrumental. 
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The dataset is from the universe of Ninth Circuit docket sheets 
for civil cases between 1996 and 2012.105 A colleague and I wrote a 
computer script to extract key information from each docket sheet and 
linked it with the Federal Judicial Center’s biographical directory of 
judges. Variables included the case subject matter, the prevailing 
party at the district court, the identity of the district court judge, the 
ABA ratings of the district court judge, the number of parties, the 
presence of repeat players (e.g., parties who frequently litigate 
appeals), whether there was federal question or diversity jurisdiction, 
the district court magistrate judge, whether a party was pro se, details 
about a party’s legal representation (e.g., city attorney, LLP, LLC, 
Department of Justice), and the votes of each judge on a panel. 
With full access to the Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records database, we could radically expand the collection of variables 
in order to improve the accuracy of statistical precedent. We could 
include, for example: whether the case was decided pursuant to a 
motion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, or a trial; 
computerized grades of litigant briefs; district-level statistical 
precedent; summaries of a district court opinion’s citation network; 
and information about the standard of review. But my aim here is only 
to show that even with a more limited set of variables, a model of 
statistical precedent can locate errors and law-development 
opportunities. Later in this Article, I explain how courts can move 
beyond the proof of concept and obtain a transparently constructed, 
implementation-quality model of a court’s statistical precedent.106 
A. Modeling the Ninth Circuit’s Statistical Precedent 
Because this is only a proof of concept, I keep the technical 
details to a minimum. In short, I used the R “SuperLearner” package 
to build an initial model of the court’s statistical precedent between 
1996 and 2010.107 The algorithm searches over multiple models, 
iteratively building each model on a subset of the training set and 
evaluating each model’s predictions on a different subset to select a 
 
 105. Habeas cases and cases reviewing agency decisions are excluded. At the time of writing 
this Article, the process of extracting variables from the docket sheets for these cases is not yet 
finished. For a more complete description of the dataset, see Copus & Hübert, supra note 32. 
 106. See infra Section V.A.  
 107. There is abundant literature on the SuperLearner package. For a particularly gentle 
introduction, see Daniel Gremmell, Ensemble Learning in R with SuperLearner, DATACAMP (Feb. 
20, 2018), https://www.datacamp.com/community/tutorials/ensemble-r-machine-learning [https:// 
perma.cc/7HWD-TUVB]. 
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model that has the best mix of bias and variance for predicting 
reversal in new datasets (e.g., future cases).108 
This initial model of statistical precedent is well calibrated for 
predicting the court’s decisionmaking in 2011 and 2012. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of statistical precedent, or the predicted 
proportion of hypothetical panels that would reverse each lower court 
decision. Cases are clustered around estimates of 30% to 40%, 
although cases have estimates as low as 7% and as high as 61%. On 
average, the estimates are accurate: regression results in the test set 
indicate that a 1% increase in estimated degree of error is associated 
with a 1.06% increase in the reversal rate.109 
 
FIGURE 3:  




But we can improve on this initial model of statistical 
precedent by incorporating predictions about how different panels 
would decide each case. Figure 4 can help build intuition. It displays 
the relationship between the initial statistical precedent for four cases 
 
 108. SuperLearner, like most machine learning techniques, uses a process of cross validation 
to test the accuracy of candidate models and choose a weighted combination of multiple models 
with the optimal mix of bias and variance. See id. I include a LASSO regression, Random Forest, 
and Gradient Boosting Machine as candidate models. The Gradient Boosting Machine generated 
the lowest cross-validated mean squared error and received all of the weight. 
 109. Standard error = 0.09%. P-value = 0.000. 
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(A, B, C, and D) and predictions for how likely fifty different panels 
are to reverse each case. The spread of the panel predictions provides 
new information. Consider, for example, case B and case C. The 
spread of panel predictions for case B is high, suggesting that panels 
would frequently reach conflicting outcomes in case B. The spread of 
panel predictions for case C is less pronounced. This is unexpected—a 
case with an estimated error of about 28% (case C) should be more 
unstable than a case with an estimated error of about 16% (case B). 
The spread of the panel predictions suggests that the statistical 
precedent should be closer to 50% for case B and further from 50% for 
case C. 
 
FIGURE 4:  




The technical details of estimating each panel’s probability of 
reversing each case and then using the spread of those predictions to 
adjust the initial model of statistical precedent are moderately 
complex, and I have placed them in the Appendix.111 The important 
takeaway is that I estimated how one thousand different panels would 
have decided each case in the test set, and the variability of those 
estimates can provide extra information about each case’s degree of 
instability and, hence, degree of error. But is there any reason to 
 
 110. For illustrative purposes, I have slightly magnified the variation in the panel statistical 
precedent. 
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believe that the estimates of one thousand different panels are 
informative? While we cannot observe whether the vast majority of 
those estimates track reality in any meaningful way, we can observe 
whether they help predict decisions of the panels that are actually 
assigned to decide a case. 
Figure 5 displays the distribution of the difference between the 
assigned panel’s predicted probability of reversing a case and the 
preliminary estimate of the collective court’s degree of error. The 
average of these panel-court deviations is zero, which one would 
expect given that “the court” is ultimately an aggregation of its panels. 
But there are also substantial deviations, and Table 2 shows that 
those deviations are indeed predictive of actual reversal: controlling 
for the court’s estimated degree of error, a 1% increase in panel-court 
deviation results in approximately a 1% increase in the reversal rate. 
This provides confidence that the estimates for the one thousand 
panels contain useful information. 
 
FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PANEL AND 
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TABLE 1: REGRESSING REVERSAL ON PANEL DEVIATIONS FROM 
STATISTICAL PRECEDENT (2011–2012 TEST SET) 
 




1.04%***  0.09% 
 
Panel Deviation  1.22%***  0.21% 
*0.05, **0.01, ***0.001 statistical significance. 
 
The panel-specific predictions also prove useful in updating the 
initial model of statistical precedent. Table 2 displays the results of a 
regression testing the predictive capacity of the adjustments. 
Controlling for the initial statistical precedent, the adjustments are 
associated with a 1.6% increase in reversal rate. 
 
TABLE 2: REGRESSING REVERSAL ON ADJUSTMENTS TO STATISTICAL 
PRECEDENT (2011–2012 TEST SET) 
 




1.06%***  0.09% 
 
Adjustments  1.64%***  0.46% 
*0.05, **0.01, ***0.001 statistical significance. 
 
Figure 6 shows that the adjusted model of statistical precedent 
matches the 2011–2012 court’s actual reversal rates, providing the 
first piece of evidence that statistical precedent can accurately 
represent the current court’s collective judgment. But it is not 
enough.112 To show that statistical precedent can help the court, we 
need to show that decisions that deviate from statistical precedent are 
indeed incompatible with a court’s jurisprudence, and we need to show 
 
 112. In technical terms, it is evidence that the predictive model is well calibrated, but it does 
little to show the model’s discriminatory power. Even if X% of cases with an estimated X% error 
are reversed, those cases may have true error degrees that are far from X%. In the worst-case 
scenario, X% of those cases have true error of 100% (all panels would consistently reverse those 
cases) and 100 - X% of those cases have true error of 0% (all panels would consistently affirm 
those cases). The estimates would be most useful to the court if they were accurate and could 
thus cleanly identify the decisions that more panels would disagree with. Insofar as the 
estimates are inaccurate, they would be less useful to the court: some decisions with lower 
estimated degrees of error would actually be more in error than decisions with higher estimated 
error. 
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that the cases with the most unstable statistical precedent are in fact 
promising opportunities for law development.113 
 
FIGURE 6: ADJUSTED STATISTICAL PRECEDENT AND REVERSAL  
(2011–2012 TEST SET)114 
 
 
B. Testing Statistical Precedent 
To investigate whether statistical precedent accurately 
captures a court’s collective wisdom, I test five hypotheses regarding 
the relationship between statistical precedent and traditional 
indicators of error and law development:115   
 
 113. Researchers are increasingly suspicious of traditional measures of discrimination, such 
as Area Under the Curve (“AUC”), for assessing the ultimate value of a predictive model. While 
useful in assessing the performance of one model against another, they do little to shed light on a 
model’s value in real-world applications. See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and 
Machine Predictions, 293 Q.J. ECON 237, 253 (2018) (“Measures such as [AUC], though, do not 
tell us whether the algorithm’s predictions can improve on decision quality.”). Nonetheless, some 
readers may be interested to know that the model of statistical precedent has an AUC of 
approximately 0.70. Note, though, that measures of discrimination are particularly 
uninformative in this application. The target of the prediction exercise—the degree of error—is 
not a dichotomous variable, although we can only assess it by reference to dichotomous 
outcomes. Thus, even a perfectly accurate model would have an AUC of less than 1 insofar as 
panels are inconsistent. 
 114. Figure 6 is a cross-validated, locally estimated scatterplot smoothing regression with 
95% confidence intervals. 
 115. I note one limitation that applies to all except the hypothesis regarding opinion 
publication. As a practical matter, the hypotheses can be tested on only published opinions. Once 
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Hypothesis 1: Circuit court decisions with higher estimated 
degrees of error should be more frequently accompanied by dissents. 
In other words, as estimates indicate that more panels would disagree 
with the assigned panel’s decision, a judge should be more likely to 
dissent. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Circuit court decisions with higher estimated 
degrees of error should be more likely to have negative subsequent 
appellate history as measured by Shepard’s citation services. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Circuit court decisions with higher estimated 
degrees of error should be more likely to have negative analysis in 
future court opinions as measured by Shepard’s citation services.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Circuit court decisions in cases with higher 
estimated degrees of instability should be cited more frequently.116  
 
Hypothesis 5: Circuit court decisions in cases with higher 
estimated degrees of instability should be published more frequently. 
We should expect that judges are already more likely to publish an 
opinion when the governing law is most underdeveloped. Thus, if 
unstable statistical precedent tracks underdeveloped law, judges 
should more frequently publish opinions when statistical precedent is 
unstable. 
 
Table 3 displays the results of five regressions. The first three 
regressions test the relationship between the estimated degree of error 
and (1) dissent, (2) subsequent negative appellate history of the same 
 
opinions are designated as unpublished, they are effectively ignored by courts, so the traditional 
indicators of error and law development do not show up for them. In fact, before 2007, Ninth 
Circuit appellate rules forbade lawyers from even citing unpublished opinions. See Sarah E. 
Ricks, A Modest Proposal for Regulating Unpublished, Non-Precedential Federal Appellate 
Opinions While Courts and Litigants Adapt to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 9 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 17, 20 (2007) (noting the prohibition on federal appellate courts restricting the 
citation of nonprecedential decisions after January 1, 2007 under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 32.1). While lawyers are now permitted to cite unpublished opinions, it is rare for 
other opinions to cite them, judges to dissent from them, or courts to review them en banc. The 
restriction of the analysis to published opinions poses a concern because they are not drawn from 
a random sample of cases. 
 116. I use Google Scholar citation counts. Note that there may be an ambiguous relationship 
between the value of precedent and citations. On the one hand, precedent in an unstable area of 
law may yield more citations as judges lean on it to guide future decisions in a still unstable 
(though perhaps more stable) area of law. On the other hand, precedent may decrease litigation 
of the issues it addresses by providing clarity to potential litigants, and precedent in unstable 
areas of law may be more likely to be superseded by newer precedent. 
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case,117 and (3) negative analysis in future opinions.118 The fourth and 
fifth regressions test the relationship between the estimated degree of 
instability and (4) citation-percentile ranking119 and (5) opinion 
publication. As hypothesized, increases in error estimates are strongly 
associated with dissents, subsequent negative appellate history, and 
negative analysis in future opinions; increases in instability estimates 
are strongly associated with citations and opinion publication. 
 
TABLE 3: REGRESSING TRADITIONAL INDICATORS ON ERROR ESTIMATES 
(2011–2012 TEST SET) 
 
*0.05, **0.01, ***0.001 statistical significance. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The results are strong evidence that statistical precedent can 
locate erroneous decisions and opportunities for developing law, 
allowing the court to revitalize the administration of justice. For 
example, consider dissents. For each additional estimated degree of 
error, the dissent rate increases by 0.3%. For the decisions with a 
degree of error above 70%, there is a remarkably high dissent rate of 
29%. What might this mean for the court? Dissents can serve as a 
signal to the court that the decision should be considered for en banc 
review,120 but they are an unreliable signal: all three of the panel 
members could have views that depart from the court’s collective 
 
 117. Because subsequent negative appellate history could cause sharp reductions in 
citations, I do not control for the number of citations when testing the relationship between error 
and subsequent negative appellate history. Regardless, controlling for citations does not 
substantially affect the estimates. 
 118. As indicated by Shepard’s signals. I exclude cases with subsequent negative appellate 
history so as not to allow appellate history to drive results in both regressions. 
 119. I use citation percentiles rather than pure citation counts due to the fact that citation 
counts are so widely distributed. Citation counts roughly follow a power-law distribution. See 
David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the 
Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 570 (2000). Using the log of citations 
rather than percentile rankings does not substantially change the results. 
 120. Deborah Beim et al., Signaling and Counter-Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An 
Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 490 (2016). In my dataset, only 
three of the 415 published decisions without a dissent were reviewed en banc, while twelve of the 
eighty-three decisions with a dissent were reviewed en banc. 
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judgment, or one of the panel judges could disagree with the other 
panel members but be too pressed for time to author a dissenting 
opinion. In such cases, there will be no dissent to call the outlier 
decision to the court’s attention. But why should a panel decision 
evade the broader court’s scrutiny simply because all of its members 
happen to be ideologically aligned or because one member happens to 
be too busy to bother with a dissent? There was once a good answer: 
we do not know how to do any better. Statistical precedent changes 
that. Courts now have access to technology that can locate the 
presumptive injustices that deserve their attention, regardless of 
whether a dissent happens to have accompanied that injustice. And 
this is just one example of many. In the next Part, I discuss how 
courts could obtain, implement, and monitor a high-powered system of 
statistical precedent that could broadly improve the administration of 
justice. 
V. ADOPTING STATISTICAL PRECEDENT 
This Part addresses some of the subtler choices and challenges 
involved in adopting a system of statistical precedent. First, I explain 
how a court could select a high-quality model of its statistical 
precedent. I then propose four simple—and, I think, uncontroversial—
reforms that could help introduce courts to the uses of statistical 
precedent. Finally, I address three commonly expressed concerns 
about the use of algorithms in the justice system: litigant gaming, 
embedded biases, and malfunctioning algorithms. 
A. Selecting the Model of Statistical Precedent 
The model of the Ninth Circuit’s statistical precedent presented 
above was meant only to show that it can successfully locate errors 
and opportunities to develop the law. I am not suggesting that the 
Ninth Circuit begin using my model. It is undoubtedly possible to 
create models that are significantly more accurate in estimating 
degrees of error and instability. More data, more variables, better 
algorithms, extra weight to more recent years, less weight to the 
decisions of judges no longer on the court, incorporation of data from 
other circuits—there are many ways to improve and tailor statistical 
precedent so as to generate more accurate estimates of error and 
instability. 
But if I am not offering a model, which model should the court 
use? A major issue is neutrality: modelers may, intentionally or not, 
embed their own preferences within their models. For example, a 
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modeler could choose to implement a regression model to generate 
predictions, thus having to manually select which variables to include, 
how to interact them, and what functional form to give any continuous 
variables. Even a modeler that is aiming to create the most predictive 
model might find herself unintentionally favoring models that reflect 
her individual conception of error rather than the court’s conception. 
A machine learning approach provides a considerable 
safeguard. For example, in building a model of the Ninth Circuit’s 
statistical precedent, I used an assortment of algorithms, each of 
which include an automated process for selecting the most predictive 
variables and making them interact. I then let the data decide which 
of the models was most predictive, using the process of cross 
validation.121 Nonetheless, if I had disliked the selected model (e.g., 
perhaps the model generated high estimates of error for decisions that 
I personally believed were correctly decided), I could have simply 
removed the model or added additional models in the hope that the 
process of cross validation would select a new model that, though 
perhaps less accurate, would better match my ideological preferences. 
Though it is much more difficult to ideologically tailor a model when 
using machine learning methods, it is possible. 
Both neutrality and accuracy could best be assured by 
decentralizing the construction of models and selecting the model that 
performs best according to a prespecified, publicly communicated, and 
standardized criterion. Fortunately, the framework for such a process 
is already in place. Corporate and government institutions alike can 
now access high-quality predictive models that are tailored to their 
organization’s specific objectives by sponsoring open competitions on 
the Kaggle website. Recently acquired by Google, Kaggle has run 
competitions for hundreds of organizations, including Microsoft, the 
National Football League, Expedia, and Home Depot.122 Government 
organizations have also jumped in. For example, the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration recently offered a $500,000 
first-place prize for the creation of an algorithm to predict potential 
threats in airport security screenings.123 The U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 
 121. For an accessible introduction to cross validation, see Jason Brownlee, A Gentle 
Introduction to K-Fold Cross-Validation, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://machinelearningmastery.com/k-fold-cross-validation/ [https://perma.cc/3NFA-Y9QL]. 
 122. For current competitions, see Competitions, KAGGLE, https://www.kaggle.com/ 
competitions (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZP4P-64E2 ].  
 123. Passenger Screening Algorithm Challenge, KAGGLE, https://www.kaggle.com/c/ 
passenger-screening-algorithm-challenge (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6ZBA-
GQSW]: 
 As part of their Apex Screening at Speed Program, DHS has identified high false 
alarm rates as creating significant bottlenecks at the airport checkpoints. Whenever 
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should pursue a similar strategy to select a model of statistical 
precedent.124 
I recommend that the courts hold annual competitions to 
predict the upcoming year’s decisions. The court could then select the 
most predictive model for use in allocating judicial attention in the 
subsequent year. The process would ensure the statistical precedent 
remains current, allow modelers to build on the strengths of previous 
models, and ensure public transparency. 
B. Proposals for Reform 
Statistical precedent may one day allow radical changes to 
courts’ operating procedures. For example, we could imagine a more 
finely tiered and gradual system of appellate review. There is little 
reason that all cases should be decided by a panel of three judges. The 
easy cases with extremely high or low error could, as an initial matter, 
be assigned to a single judge. If that judge’s decision were made as 
expected, it could serve as the final decision. If the decision were 
unexpected (e.g., the judge affirmed a case with a high degree of error 
or reversed a case with a low degree of error), the case could be 
expedited for review by an additional judge. For moderately difficult 
cases with greater instability, the court might assign the traditional 
three-judge panel. And for the hard cases with instability estimates 
 
TSA’s sensors and algorithms predict a potential threat, TSA staff needs to engage in 
a secondary, manual screening process that slows everything down. And as the 
number of travelers increase every year and new threats develop, their prediction 
algorithms need to continually improve to meet the increased demand.  
 Currently, TSA purchases updated algorithms exclusively from the manufacturers 
of the scanning equipment used. These algorithms are proprietary, expensive, and 
often released in long cycles. In this competition, TSA is stepping outside their 
established procurement process and is challenging the broader data science 
community to help improve the accuracy of their threat prediction algorithms. Using a 
dataset of images collected on the latest generation of scanners, participants are 
challenged to identify the presence of simulated threats under a variety of object 
types, clothing types, and body types. Even a modest decrease in false alarms will 
help TSA significantly improve the passenger experience while maintaining high 
levels of security. 
 124. A frequent choice in Kaggle competitions that focus on datasets with dichotomous 
outcomes is the AUC, and it would be a strong option as a criterion for a court’s model selection. 
One of the core advantages of AUC over other common metrics (e.g., the correct classification 
rate or F1 score) is that it does not depend on a choice of threshold. This is particularly important 
in the context of statistical precedent because the ultimate goal is not to partition cases—the 
goal is to estimate the degree of error, which is not actually a zero or one. For clarity, consider 
the possibility that there are in fact no decisions that a majority of panels would reverse. We 
would still wish to know which cases have a higher degree of error. But with a measure like the 
correct classification rate, a perfectly accurate model would perform no better than a useless 
model that simply estimated a 0% degree of error for every decision. 
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close to 50%, courts could assign larger panels, effectively providing a 
mechanism for courts to resolve their internal inconsistencies and 
clarify law. But any such radical restructuring should be postponed 
until we have a better understanding of how statistical precedent 
operates. At least initially, it is probably the case that the information 
should simply be made available to judges, letting them explore the 
varied uses for the estimates. Below, I offer four moderate reforms 
that judges should consider implementing in the near future. 
1. Flag Panel Decisions that Depart Widely  
from Statistical Precedent 
There are, especially in large courts, simply too many opinions 
for courts to meaningfully review their own opinions. The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, produces on average two new published opinions 
per work day.125 But “[t]he full court must, in order to prevent 
different panels from deciding cases inconsistently and thus greatly 
reducing the certainty of legal obligation, maintain a credible threat to 
rehear a case en banc if the panel deviates from the law of the 
circuit.”126 
Simply notifying all judges of how far each opinion deviates 
from statistical precedent would allow judges to at least meaningfully 
review the set of decisions that are most incompatible with their 
court’s jurisprudence. Panels, unable to hide in the mass of opinions, 
would have more reason to try to decide cases in accordance with the 
court’s collective conception of justice. Of course, many panels are 
undoubtedly trying to fit their decisions into the broader law and 
simply failing in that effort.127 Thus, even in the absence of a credible 
threat to have the case reviewed en banc, such judges would be happy 
to receive feedback from other judges before their opinions are 
finalized.128 
 
 125. See, e.g., Kleinfeld Statement, supra note 17, at 5:  
If we ignore the unpublished decisions (as most of us are forced to do, allowing for 
much error to go uncorrected in them), there were still 557 published dispositions, 
each with precedential force. Keeping up would require us to read around three per 
day, manageable if one is not on calendar, but generating a pile of about 15 plus the 
new ones that come in on Monday after a week on calendar. At that point, the 
opinions can only be glanced at to see if they affect pending cases or resolve matters in 
which the judge happens to have a particularly strong interest. 
 126. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 133 (1996). 
 127. See, e.g., O’Scannlain Statement, supra note 17, at 10 (“[I]t seems increasingly common 
for three judge panels to make sua sponte en banc requests for review of their own decisions, 
because they uncover directly conflicting Ninth Circuit precedent on a dispositive issue.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Berzon, supra note 85, at 1490 n.49 (“[W]e are quite receptive to altering 
opinions after publication based on feedback from our colleagues.”). 
Copus_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2020  1:03 PM 
2020] STATISTICAL PRECEDENT 649 
2. Add Flagged Unpublished Decisions to a Public High-Risk List 
Unpublished opinions are so numerous that they would 
probably overwhelm a simple flagging system—judges would still have 
too little attention to meaningfully review each other’s problematic, 
nonprecedential decisions. Something more is needed if courts are to 
meaningfully attend to unpublished opinions. 
And there are good reasons to believe that attention is needed. 
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas have each independently 
charged circuit courts with abusing nonpublication,129 and Judge 
Patricia Wald, former chief judge of the D.C. Circuit, wrote that 
nonpublication allows for “deviousness and abuse.”130 Empirical 
research lends support to those claims.131 An Eighth Circuit panel 
went so far as to declare unpublished opinions unconstitutional.132 
Judge Wald succinctly summarizes the vast body of literature 
criticizing unpublished opinions: 
[I]t is argued that unpublished opinions: result in less carefully prepared or soundly 
reasoned opinions; reduce judicial accountability; increase the risk of nonuniformity; 
allow difficult issues to be swept under the carpet; and result in a body of “secret law” 
practically inaccessible to many lawyers. Furthermore, there is no uniformly enforced or 
practiced guidelines for making the publication decision; hence judges exercise 
considerable discretion in deciding when an opinion should be published, i.e., when an 
opinion will become law.133 
 
 129. Adam Liptak, Courts Write Decisions that Elude Long View, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/us/justice-clarence-thomas-court-decisions-that-set-no-
precedent.html [https://perma.cc/3T9V-Y66M]. 
 130. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995). 
 131. See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum 
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2004) (finding “that there exists, for some 
judges, a significant relationship between how the judge votes on the merits of the case, and 
whether the case is published”). 
 132. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh’g 
en banc, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 133. Nat’l Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 173 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(separate statement of Wald, J.) (citing Wald, supra note 101, at 781–84). Boyce F. Martin, the 
former chief judge of the Sixth Circuit, has provided a similar list of criticisms. Martin, supra 
note 52, at 180:  
• loss of precedent, that unpublished opinions are, in fact precedent but 
cannot be used as such;  
• sloppy decisions, that judges are careless when they know they are writing 
an unpublished opinion;  
• lack of uniformity, that panels cannot follow other panels when they are 
unaware of other panels’ unpublished opinions;  
• difficulty of higher court review, that the Supreme Court is far less likely to 
review an unpublished opinion than it is to review a published opinion;  
• unfairness to litigants, that litigants deserve published opinions;  
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Despite the daunting size of the literature, I am aware of no 
effort to address the problems posed by unpublished opinions—except 
for arguments that the courts stop using them. But there is absolutely 
no sign that courts will reverse course on the use of unpublished 
opinions. The publication rate has continuously decreased, and there 
is no indication that judges are willing to relinquish the convenience of 
issuing unpublished opinions.134 
The courts could implement a “high-risk list” for unpublished 
opinions, modeled after the “six-month list” that Congress instituted 
to reduce delays in the federal district courts. By law, the number of 
every judge’s motions that have been pending for more than six 
months are made public.135 While there is debate about whether the 
six-month list has been successful, its soft law approach is a promising 
way to balance the need for a flexible judiciary with accountability for 
unelected, life-tenured judges.136 To rein in the inappropriate use of 
unpublished decisions, courts could publish lists of unpublished 
decisions that dispose of cases in ways that their colleagues would 
most likely disagree with. While such a high-risk list does not address 
all commentator concerns, it could help increase judicial 
accountability, decrease the risk of nonuniformity, and make it harder 
to sweep difficult issues “under the carpet.” Maintaining a public list 
could shame judges in order to limit the abuse of unpublished 
opinions—they might be more attentive to cases, less likely to try and 
hide an outcome that is unsupported by the law, less likely to avoid 
difficult legal issues,137 and less likely to agree to withdraw a dissent 
in exchange for nonpublication.138  
Of course, there could be occasions when an unpublished 
opinion is justified (e.g., statistical precedent is inaccurate), and we 
 
• less judicial accountability, that the unpublished opinion, particularly the 
per curiam, allows the judge to hide outside the public glare;  
• less predictability, that any opinion provides a roadmap of the law and a 
sense of the direction in which the law is developing. 
 134. See, e.g., Patrick Schiltz, Much Ado About Nothing: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang 
over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1484 (2005) (“Judges 
have told me that being forced to treat their unpublished opinions as binding precedent would 
create chaos and that it would take decades to repair the damage.”). 
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 476(a)(1) (2012). 
 136. See Miguel de Figueiredo et al., Against Judicial Accountability: Evidence from the Six 
Month List 6 (Feb. 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2989777 
[https://perma.cc/Z2RZ-2T8Z]. 
 137. See Wald, supra note 130, at 1374 (“I have seen judges purposely compromise on an 
unpublished decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming 
public debate about what law controls.”). 
 138. See id. (“I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along with a result they do not 
like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent.”). 
Copus_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2020  1:03 PM 
2020] STATISTICAL PRECEDENT 651 
would and should not expect the list to remain empty. But unusually 
frequent use of unpublished opinions with high error estimates should 
be disconcerting. To illustrate what the list might look like, Table 4 
displays a 2010–2011 high-risk list for the Ninth Circuit, showing the 
number of unpublished decisions issued by each judge that deviated 
from statistical precedent by more than 70%. Judges are not uniformly 
using unpublished opinions. Judges William Fletcher, Ronald Gould, 
and Sidney Thomas lead the list; each were members of panels that 
issued more than ten high-risk unpublished opinions. Other active 
judges—who review the same cases on average—have much lower 
counts. It would be too much to claim that the former judges are 
strategically abusing nonpublication, but might they be 
underestimating just how “easy” their decisions are?139 
 
 
 139. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Noise: How to Overcome the High, Hidden Cost of 
Inconsistent Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2016, at 38, 43 (“Experienced professionals 
tend to have high confidence in the accuracy of their own judgments, and they also have high 
regard for their colleagues’ intelligence. This combination inevitably leads to an overestimation 
of agreement.”). 
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TABLE 4: HIGH-RISK UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS  
(NINTH CIRCUIT 2010–2011) 
 
William Fletcher 14 William Canby* 6 
Ronald Gould 12 Procter Hug* 5 
Sidney Thomas 11 John Noonan* 5 
Richard Paez 10 Susan Graber 5 
Atsushi Tashima* 9 Raymond Fisher 5 
Richard Clifton 9 Joseph Farris* 5 
Norman Smith 9 Michael Hawkins* 4 
Betty Fletcher* 9 Ferdinand Fernandez* 4 
Harry Pregerson 8 Edward Leavy* 3 
Kim Wardlaw 8 John Wallace* 3 
Johnnie Rawlinson 8 Carlos Bea 3 
Jay Bybee 8 Andrew Kleinfeld* 2 
Diarmuid O’Scannlain 7 Alex Kozinski 2 
Mary Schroeder* 7 Arthur Alarcon* 2 
Stephen Trott* 7 Marsha Berzon 2 
Barry Silverman 7 Richard Tallman 2 
Sandra Ikuta 7 Consuelo Callahan 2 
Alfred Goodwin* 7 Robert Beezer* 1 
Stephen Reinhardt 6 Dorothy Nelson* 1 
M. McKeown 6 Thomas Reavley*^ 1 
Milan Smith 6 Pamela Rymer 1 
*Senior Status, ^Visiting Judge 
 
At the very least, both the court and the public should be aware 
of the wide variation in the use of unpublished opinions. The list 
would draw attention to a problem that is otherwise all too easy to 
ignore—inconsistency. If judges can differ so dramatically in their use 
of unpublished decisions, it is an indication that the criteria for 
publication are too vague to generate shared practices. Those criteria 
are the subject of the next proposal. 
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3. Include Unstable Statistical Precedent as a  
Criterion for Publication 
With an overall publication rate of less than 10%,140 it is 
critical that courts publish opinions where the law is most in need of 
development. The existing publication criteria do little to aid judges in 
making that determination. The criteria across circuits “amount to 
little more than saying that an opinion should not be published unless 
it is likely to have value as precedent.”141 Not only are they essentially 
tautological, but they are also wildly overbroad—almost every decision 
has some precedential value, but the courts simply cannot publish an 
opinion in every case. The criteria are flexible in an additional way: 
they say more about the actual opinion written than they do the 
underlying issues. The main criterion for publication is if an opinion 
“establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law.”142 
One judge might author an opinion describing the result as some 
mechanical application of existing law, while another might justify the 
result as some modification, alteration, or establishment of law. 
There is no particular reason to believe that judges are good at 
identifying the cases that are best for creating precedential value, and 
they likely miss many opportunities for valuable law development.143 
The fact that judges display such wide variation in publication 
practices means that at least some of them are passing on the best 
opportunities.144 As I have shown above, statistical precedent can 
locate those opportunities. By including unstable statistical precedent 
as a criterion, courts can help judges identify the cases that are most 
undetermined by existing law. 
4. Use Statistical Precedent to Assign Cases to Staff Attorneys 
The courts’ treatment of pro se appeals is a high-profile issue at 
the moment. Judge Richard Posner’s retirement, driven in part by 
what he regarded as his court’s neglect of pro se appellants, and his 
 
 140.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 141. POSNER, supra note 126, at 165. 
 142. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); see 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a) (designating a written disposition as an opinion 
if it “[e]stablishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of federal law”). 
 143. See generally Donald R. Songer et al., Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An 
Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 984 (1989) (concluding that the criteria for 
publication provide little guidance and are inconsistently applied). 
 144. My own analysis of Ninth Circuit opinions shows that different panels can disagree over 
the decision to publish in more than 30% of civil cases. 
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recent book have vaulted the issue into the public spotlight.145 Courts 
routinely assign pro se appeals to staff attorneys for an initial 
decision—decisions that judges are supposed to review before signing 
off on them.146 While judges are obviously not bound by a staff 
attorney’s initial decision, Posner claims that judges tend to “rubber 
stamp” them,147 and the overwhelming recommendation by staff 
attorneys in the Seventh Circuit is to affirm (83%).148 Courts 
presumably assign pro se appeals to staff attorneys because they 
collectively have a low degree of error—most panels would not assign 
error to the lower court. In the resource allocation framework, there is 
thus little need to dedicate judicial attention to those cases. But do all 
pro se appeals have low degrees of error? Should perhaps some of 
them be assigned to chambers, provided legal representation, and 
tracked for oral argument? While overworked judges and staff 
attorneys may be able to identify some of those cases, error estimates 
from statistical precedent could likely aid that effort. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of error estimates for pro se 
appeals and for all other appeals in the Ninth Circuit. According to 
these estimates, while “pro se” is not an awful proxy for low merit, it is 
far from perfect. Approximately 10% of civil pro se appeals have error 
estimates that place them in the range of other civil cases. Thirty-
eight percent of pro se appeals with error estimates higher than 20% 
were reversed, but what percentage of the affirmances would have 
switched to reversals had the court allocated more judicial attention to 
them? We do not know, but I see little justification for assigning those 
cases to staff attorneys along with all of the other pro se appeals.149 
Furthermore, as I discuss in Section V.D below, the error estimates for 
pro se cases may be understated relative to other cases if statistical 
precedent reflects the court’s historical deprivation of attention to 
them. It is thus particularly important that courts at least provide 




 145. See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT 
NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL 
ARGUMENTS 135–44 (2017) (describing most judges and staff attorneys as unsympathetic 
towards pro se litigants). 
 146. See generally Levy, supra note 23, at 380–81 (detailing the docketing practices of five 
circuit courts). 
 147. POSNER, supra note 145, at 6. 
 148. Id. at 9. 
 149. Note that I do not know whether some of these pro se appeals were ultimately assigned 
to judicial chambers. But this points to another problem with the current triage system—it is not 
a transparent system. 
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FIGURE 7: STATISTICAL PRECEDENT FOR PRO SE APPEALS 
 
 
C. Some Concerns 
I acknowledge that the combination of artificial intelligence 
and law makes many people uneasy. But data analytics is changing 
industries, and the courts risk committing widespread injustice by 
continuing to abstain. Finance, banking, sales, medicine, elections, 
and sports have all been deeply impacted by the adoption of predictive 
technology and improvements in this technology. Our justice systems 
have not kept pace, and it should be alarming that sports franchises 
are so much more advanced. What happens in our courts matters, and 
we should be doing better. Why aren’t we? 
There are three misconceptions that I think help explain why 
predictive technology has been so slow to catch on in courts. First, in 
many of our justice systems, there is no obvious way to measure a 
case’s merit without simply deciding it: we use courts as our scales of 
justice. Parts of the criminal justice system stand out as exceptions: 
recidivism is a critical and measurable outcome, predictions of which 
can proxy for the merits of an individual’s case and inform 
decisionmaking.150 This likely explains why some parts of the criminal 
 
 150. See, e.g., Kleinberg et al., supra note 113, at 243 (“Recidivism, which is one relevant 
input to sentencing someone who has been found guilty, can be predicted.”). 
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justice system have been uniquely accepting of analytics. In contrast, 
there is seemingly nothing we can predict that would inform, for 
example, a panel’s decision in an employment discrimination or free 
speech case. But to the extent that we trust the judgment of our 
judges and value consistency in decisionmaking, their judgments are a 
valuable target of prediction. Much like historical recidivism patterns 
can help parole boards find individuals that should be paroled, 
historical reversal patterns can help courts find—and pay attention 
to—decisions that should be reversed or need legal clarification. 
The second misconception is that an algorithm must include 
and properly process legally relevant variables to be useful. Most of us 
believe that law is a critically important factor in judicial 
decisionmaking. Thus, the thinking goes, an algorithm that cannot 
process legally relevant variables in a legally relevant manner cannot 
accurately assess legal merit. And if it can, is that not evidence of 
radical legal realism and a threat to our belief in the rule of law? 
Those concerns are understandable but ultimately misplaced. Even 
where law is the dominant factor in decisions, an algorithm only needs 
access to variables that are statistically associated with law to 
generate accurate predictions. And the mechanisms by which cases 
are selected into the circuit courts make such correlations readily 
plausible.151 For example, the beliefs of attorneys and district court 
judges are presumably important determinants of which cases are 
ultimately appealed. If those judgments are responsive to legal merits, 
then variables for attorneys and district judges (or variables that 
correlate with those variables) can be important predictors of legal 
merit. Thus, while legally relevant variables could very well increase 
the accuracy of predictions, they are not a prerequisite. In fact, legally 
relevant variables may be particularly unimportant predictors where 
law matters most: if the development of precedent matters, then the 
legal relevance of legally relevant variables will shift over time, 
making them poor predictors of future decisionmaking. Moreover, 
there is robust empirical evidence that models of judicial 
decisionmaking can be accurate without access to law. For example, 
statistical predictions based on a simple set of six general case 
 
 151. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (presenting a model of the litigation process driven by economic factors, 
such as “the expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information that 
parties possess about the likelihood of success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and 
settlement”). 
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characteristics outperformed legal specialists in predicting Supreme 
Court decisions.152 
Third, the combination of algorithms and justice inspires 
dystopian visions of machines deciding our fates, violating our notions 
of due process in the name of a more efficient system. But as 
demonstrated in this article, algorithmically aided justice need not be 
about coarse efficiency, and it need not raise due process issues. 
Statistical precedent is not about saving money or time—it is about 
ensuring just decisions and producing precedent that can help society 
navigate the complexities of law. Nor is statistical precedent about 
machines deciding our fates. It is not even about machines 
recommending outcomes to judges. It is about guiding the much less 
deliberate and less informed choice of where to even focus attention—
a choice that is generally not itself the product of very focused 
attention. 
In fact, as I argue in this Section, statistical precedent—as a 
tool to guide attention rather than recommend or automate merit 
decisions—largely evades the standard objections to algorithm-
assisted decisionmaking. 
1. Litigant Gaming 
Algorithmic decisionmaking can suffer from Campbell’s Law: 
“The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the 
more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is 
intended to monitor.”153 Distortion pressures are one of the core 
reasons that this Article does not propose that error estimates be used 
to recommend, much less automate, the ultimate outcome of an 
appeal. For example, imagine that the selected algorithm used 
information about law firms to make predictions, and that appeals by 
litigants represented by a Vault 100 law firm tended to have high 
 
 152. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political 
Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 
1151–52 (2004):  
In advance of the oral argument date, we obtained predicted outcomes using two 
methods—one a statistical model that forecasts outcomes based on six general case 
characteristics, and the other a set of independent predictions from a large group of 
legal specialists, each making particularized assessments of one or more cases. . . . 
[T]he machine did significantly better at predicting outcomes than did the experts. 
While the experts correctly forecast outcomes in 59.1% of cases, the machine got a full 
75% right. 
 153. Donald T. Campbell, Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change, 2 EVALUATION & 
PROGRAM PLAN. 67, 85 (1979) (emphasis removed). 
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estimated degrees of error. While it is possible that such 
representation is causally responsible for the higher degrees of error, 
it could also be the case that it is a mere correlation. If the latter, and 
circuit courts were deciding actual case outcomes by reference to error 
estimates, litigants might alter their behavior and hire Vault 100 
firms to artificially boost their chances of winning. 
Moving from the substantive outcome to the distribution of 
attention greatly diminishes the risk of litigant gaming. When a weak 
(strong) appeal has an artificially inflated (deflated) degree of error, 
there is a worry that using an algorithm to help decide the outcome 
will cause the court to incorrectly reverse (affirm) the appeal. Efforts 
to inflate or deflate error estimates in order to manipulate judicial 
attention are likely to be less attractive. The battle for judicial 
attention is simply less consequential: unless the courts’ shortage of 
judicial attention is much worse than we think, an appeal still has a 
reasonable probability of being decided correctly even with limited 
judicial attention. 
Regardless of the payoff from successful gaming, it would 
generally be a costly, complex, and unpredictable endeavor. Many of 
the variables included in predictive models would likely be drawn 
from district court and agency litigation. And given the expense and 
the importance of prevailing at initial stages, litigants would hesitate 
to sacrifice optimal litigation strategies merely in anticipation of 
avoiding judicial attention at the circuit court should they happen to 
mistakenly prevail. Even understanding how to manipulate an 
algorithm would be difficult for litigants: the so called “black box” of 
machine learning, often derided for its opaqueness,154 provides a 
safeguard against manipulation. Those parties sophisticated enough 
to successfully manipulate statistical precedent are likely to receive 
extensive attention regardless. Finally, attempts at manipulation may 
be undone (or even backfire) as the litigation process continues to 
unfold. Because variables frequently interact in machine learning 
models, attempts to manipulate them would often have to account for 
future events.155   
 
 154. See, e.g., Cynthia Rudin, Algorithms and Justice: Scrapping the ‘Black Box,’ CRIME REP. 
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/26/algorithms-and-justice-scrapping-the-
black-box/ [https://perma.cc/FXL4-PU8Y] (criticizing proprietary “black box” tools for their 
potential to produce flawed calculations, which if unnoticed, could become the basis of a court 
decision). 
 155. For example, suppose that a court’s algorithm uses a variable that can be manipulated 
at a relatively low cost, such as the prevalence of citations in each party’s briefs. The ultimate 
effect of one litigant’s citation count on the estimates may depend on the other litigant’s citation 
count. 
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In summary, the minimal payoff for manipulating judicial 
attention, coupled with its cost, complexity, and uncertainty, is likely 
to make litigant gaming rare and inconsequential. Nonetheless, it is 
admittedly difficult to predict the extent of litigant gaming a priori. 
The opportunities for gaming ultimately depend on the models 
selected by a court, the ease with which impactful variables can be 
manipulated, the ability of litigants to manipulate those variables 
covertly so as to not draw unwanted attention, and how judges and 
courts choose to implement the models. It may even be possible, 
though I think unlikely, that individual judges’ assessments of error 
would be influenced by exposure to an error estimate. It is an issue 
that courts and scholars would need to assess upon selection of models 
and continue to monitor as the models are implemented. 
If litigant gaming does indeed pose a problem, the courts could 
employ a number of strategies to combat it. Most simply, the courts 
could limit the variables that modeling teams are permitted to use to 
those that are costly to manipulate (e.g., variables derived from 
district court and agency litigation). While this would come at the cost 
of predictive accuracy, the protection against gaming could warrant it. 
A more sophisticated approach could involve selecting not just the best 
performing model, but the subset of models that meet some specified 
level of predictive performance.156 Insofar as the models produce 
similarly accurate predictions through a diverse set of variables and 
mechanisms, averaging the predictions from the subset of models 
would reduce the opportunities for gaming while minimally impacting 
predictive power. 
2. Status Quo Bias 
Because statistical precedent relies on datasets of historical 
decisions, there may be a concern that it would tie the courts to 
outdated conceptions of error. While such a status quo bias might be a 
concern if algorithms were being used to guide merit decisions, it is 
difficult to imagine how targeting judicial attention could 
substantially impair a court’s ability to develop new conceptions of 
error. Furthermore, if models are selected in accordance with the 
procedure I outline above, older decisions would only be used insofar 
as they help predict decisions in the year before a model is 
 
 156. For more discussion of this point, see Hannah Laqueur & Ryan Copus, Synthetic 
Crowdsourcing: A Machine-Learning Approach to Inconsistency in Adjudication 26 (Dec. 6, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694326 [https://perma.cc/GSZ8-
K6R9]. 
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implemented, which should alleviate concerns that the models are 
tying courts to outdated conceptions of error. 
More worrisome is the possibility that statistical precedent 
helps to cement historical judicial failures to identify decisions that 
both past and present judges would—if they paid more attention—
agree are in error. The degrees of error and instability are defined by 
reference to hypothetical panel decisions that are made after close 
evaluation. But some actual panel decisions are likely inattentive 
mistakes—had the panel more carefully considered the case, it would 
have made a different decision.157 For example, some decisions may be 
a result of the fact that a panel gave only cursory review to a staff 
attorney’s or law clerk’s draft of an opinion. Thus, any dataset used to 
build a model will include decisions that are the result of either close 
evaluation or a panel’s inattentive mistake. Moreover, there is 
generally no way to identify which decisions were a product of a 
mistake, and these mistakes can have implications for the accuracy of 
error and instability estimates. 
Under certain conditions, these inattentive panel mistakes can 
result in systematically deflated error estimates for particular sets of 
cases.158 Pro se appeals may be in particular danger. If many judges 
have effectively given up on searching for meritorious pro se 
appeals,159 estimates will tend to understate the error of those 
appeals, helping to continue the deprivation of judicial attention 
(although note that Section V.B.4 showed that some pro se appeals 
can have high estimated error). 
There are at least three ways to address the possibility that 
courts have systematically deprived certain cases of attention. First, 
courts could provide separate treatment for pro se appeals (or other 
types of cases that may be systematically affirmed due to inattentive 
mistake) so as to avoid ignoring them when their deflated error 
estimates are lower than other, less meritorious cases. In brief, courts 
could compare error estimates for pro se appeals against other pro se 
appeals, setting a separate, pro-se-specific threshold. One might think 
of this as an affirmative action program for pro se appellants, meant 
to rectify historical deficits of attention. Second, as noted above, the 
court should continuously conduct tests on an algorithm’s performance 
 
 157. See infra Appendix, Part A for a more detailed discussion of inattentive panel mistakes 
and their effects on error and instability estimates. 
 158. See infra Appendix, Part A. 
 159. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 145, at 135–36 (noting that most judges were uninterested 
in pro se appeals). 
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by providing extensive judicial attention to randomly selected cases. 
This could help courts identify cases that need extra attention. 
The third solution relies on law professors and the bar 
donating their judgment to the courts. Statistical precedent relies on 
datasets of decisions, but there is no reason—technical, constitutional, 
or statutory—that those decisions must be actual judicial decisions. 
We could rely on other sources of collective wisdom to help build the 
dataset. For example, the Federal Judicial Center, in conjunction with 
the circuit courts, could establish blue-ribbon committees of lawyers 
and professors to carefully review briefs from current cases, conduct 
legal research, and donate their recommendations to a dataset. 
Insofar as the decisions conflict with the decisions of central staff, they 
would provide an immediate alert that a case needs more attention. 
But these decision donations would also yield benefits in the future. 
First, the machine learning algorithms used to build statistical 
precedent perform better with larger datasets, and a blue-ribbon 
committee could provide that additional data without further taxing 
judicial resources. Second, the availability of multiple decisions on the 
same case is a particularly valuable source of statistical 
information.160 Third, the committee could focus on correcting for 
systematic blind spots the courts may have. By focusing on pro se 
cases, for example, the blue-ribbon committee could effectively embed 
more attention for pro se appellants into the system.161  
Concerns about status quo bias also highlight the need to 
provide a baseline level of attention for all cases. Courts cannot, either 
under the guidance of statistical precedent or under the guidance of 
rough preconceptions (e.g., “pro se” as a proxy for “low merit”), safely 
deprive cases of a minimal level of attention. A baseline level of 
attention helps prevent major injustices, allows statistical precedent 
to update with changes in the merits of appeals, and promotes 
procedural fairness.162 
 
 160. Using actual judicial decisions to estimate instability is difficult, requiring complex 
computations. See infra Appendix, Part B. Multiple decisions on the same case, even if they are 
not from judges, provide directly observable evidence of a case’s degree of instability. 
 161. Levy suggests that courts experiment with cases that have historically received low 
levels of judicial attention by providing them with more judicial attention so that we can 
estimate the extent of outcome-determinative attention shortages. Levy, supra note 29, at 441–
42, I support her proposal, but I think it could be usefully supplemented with the work of a blue-
ribbon committee. 
 162. Although I have not focused on procedural justice in this Article, it fits nicely with a 
system of statistical precedent, as a baseline level of attention is critical for maintaining and 
improving its accuracy. 
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3. Malfunction 
Like any technology, algorithms can simply malfunction. 
Perhaps data is stored in some new way such that the algorithm 
misprocesses it and generates poor predictions. Or maybe there is 
some major change in the world that causes a widespread disconnect 
between historical and present statistical associations.163 
We can and should try to be careful to make sure that 
algorithms do not malfunction, but we also have to prepare for the 
possibility that they might, especially if they are deeply embedded into 
a core institution like the federal judiciary. And the most important 
thing we can do is make sure that there is a system in place for 
detecting any serious malfunction. Fortunately, statistical precedent 
provides immediate and constant feedback: because it is ultimately a 
prediction of a how a case will be treated once it is provided more 
attention, the courts would be able to continuously test those 
predictions. 
But it is also theoretically possible that statistical precedent 
could malfunction in a subset of cases that it is not recommending 
receive additional attention. Again, a baseline level of attention would 
alert the court to any major malfunctions with respect to those cases. 
But courts could provide additional safeguards. They might, for 
example, randomly provide extensive attention to a small sample of 
cases to make sure that the results are consistent with the algorithmic 
predictions. Such randomized checks could also be more targeted, with 
the court giving greater weight to sets of cases for which the accuracy 
of statistical precedent is a particular concern (e.g., pro se appeals).164 
CONCLUSION 
Is statistical precedent a politically feasible approach to 
mitigating the effect of burdensome caseloads and large courts on the 
quality of appellate justice, or is it a technocratic fantasy? If the 
experience of other industries is a good indication, the use of 
algorithms in adjudication will be met with heavy skepticism. The 
struggle for acceptance is most famously documented in American 
 
 163. I have struggled without success to come up with some plausible example. But as 
unlikely as such a world-changing event might be—at least such that the distribution of judicial 
attention would remain on the list of things we care about—it still seems worth consideration. 
 164. This is a simple extension of Levy’s proposal that the courts conduct randomized tests of 
judicial attention. See Levy, supra note 29, at 441–442 (“[Courts] could randomly select a 
percentage of cases that normally receive nonargument track treatment and instead give them 
full judicial treatment . . . . One could then examine the outcomes in those cases and compare 
them to the outcomes in the rest of the argument cases.”). 
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baseball,165 but the basic story is transsubstantive and now effectively 
a trope: decisionmakers overestimate their own judgments and 
underestimate analytics—until a competitor embraces analytics. If 
you want to win an election, a championship, a stock market trade, or 
even your fantasy football league, you embrace analytics. Courts face 
no such competitive pressure from one another. 
The success of analytics in other industries may help mitigate 
doubts about its value in the courts, but there is a path forward for 
statistical precedent even if it is met with widespread skepticism. 
Most importantly, statistical precedent could begin working without 
Congressional action, centralized adoption by circuits, or even 
substantial judicial interest—litigant desire for judicial attention 
could drive the adoption of statistical precedent. If estimates existed, 
parties might want to include them in their briefs (e.g., to avoid 
assignment to staff attorneys), petitions for rehearing en banc, and 
requests for oral argument. If so, legal research services like Westlaw 
or Lexis—organizations that are already collecting massive amounts 
of data on litigation in federal courts—might have the incentive to 
generate estimates of error and instability for their clients. Thus, even 
if unwilling to lead the way, the courts might be eased into statistical 
precedent.166 But courts should not wait. Only they have full access to 
the data, can implement court-wide procedures for allocating 
attention, and can ensure public transparency.167 
Although I focus on the U.S. Courts of Appeals in this Article, 
statistical precedent could be implemented in a wide variety of 
adjudication systems that are struggling with burdensome caseloads 
and untethered judges. One could imagine statistical precedent in 
state intermediate appellate courts, the Social Security 
Administration’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, 
 
 165. Baseball’s “Moneyball” story is well known because of Michael Lewis’s best-selling book, 
see MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003), which inspired 
a movie starring Brad Pitt that was nominated for six Academy Awards. 
 166. It is also encouraging that the courts already have experience with a rudimentary form 
of statistical precedent—the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The sentencing guidelines were 
generated and adopted with a philosophy similar to the one that statistical precedent rests on—
leveraging the collective, historical sentencing patterns to build a model for future sentencing. 
The ultimate success of the guidelines may have been hindered by flaws in both design and 
implementation. Perhaps most importantly, the guidelines are almost certainly subject to 
litigant (prosecutor) gaming. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1336 (2005) (discussing 
the transfer of discretion from judges to prosecutors). But the very fact of their existence and 
continued role in the federal judicial system is a promising sign for the political fortunes of 
statistical precedent.  
 167. I presume that Westlaw or LexisNexis, as profit-driven companies, would not make 
their models of statistical precedent available to the public. 
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immigration courts, parole boards, the Patent and Trademark Office—
the list is almost endless. I hope this Article can provide a guide for 
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APPENDIX 
A. Inattentive Panel Mistakes 
The degree of error and instability are defined by reference to 
hypothetical panel decisions that are made after close evaluation. But 
some actual panel decisions are likely inattentive mistakes—had the 
panel more carefully considered the case, it would have made a 
different decision. For example, some decisions may be a result of the 
fact that a panel gave only cursory review to a staff attorney’s or law 
clerk’s draft of an opinion. Thus, any dataset used to build a model 
will include decisions that are the result of either close evaluation or a 
panel’s inattentive mistake. Moreover, there is generally no way to 
identify which decisions were a product of a mistake, and these 
mistakes can have implications for the accuracy of error and 
instability estimates. 
Of course, insofar as mistakes are infrequent, they have no 
effect on the accuracy of error or instability estimates: if they are rare 
in the data, they will not substantially affect the estimates of error. 
But if mistakes are common, their effect on the estimates depends on 
the type of mistakes that panels make and how they are distributed 
across cases. For illustrative purposes, let us assume that panels 
frequently make mistakes. 
Consider three types of mistakes that panels could make.168 
First, for some sets of cases, panels might have something close to a 
constant probability of making a mistake: panels that would reverse a 
case after careful evaluation might mistakenly affirm with a 20% 
probability, and panels that would affirm might mistakenly reverse 
with a 20% probability. Such mistake patterns might be common, for 
example, in those cases where a panel relies heavily on the 
recommendations of law clerks. Second, panels might be much more 
likely to mistakenly affirm some sets of cases than they are to 
mistakenly reverse them. Decisions on cases assigned to staff 
attorneys might have such mistake patterns if judges generally 
provide cursory attention to staff attorney recommendations and 
would only scrutinize recommendations to reverse. Third, some sets of 
cases might be more prone to mistake as instability increases: if 
panels are split between themselves on whether a case should be 
 
 168. These mistake types are not exhaustive of all possible types of mistakes. For example, I 
leave out what I think is the unlikely possibility that panels are much more prone to mistakenly 
reversing some sets of cases than mistakenly affirming them. I believe the three types of 
mistakes I discuss capture the core of what we should be worried about. 
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reversed, an individual panel may also wrestle with the correct 
decision, stopping before it arrives at the decision that more reflection 
would have yielded.169 
Appendix Figure 1 displays the expected effects from the three 
different types of mistakes on estimated error as well as expected 
estimates where there are no mistakes. Note that if the types of 
mistakes made are constant across all cases, there is little reason for 
concern that error estimates would be an unreliable guide: for each 
type of mistake, we would expect estimates to increase with the true 
degrees of error. But there are concerns if different types of mistakes 
are made in different sets of cases, reflected by the gaps between lines. 
For example, consider four different sets of cases, each with true error 
of 75%. If one set of cases is not subject to mistakes, we would expect 
those cases to each have an error estimate of 75%. But expected 
estimates for sets of cases subject to mistakes would be different: an 
expected 65% error estimate for cases subject to either a general 20% 
or instability-dependent probability of mistake and an expected 60% 
error estimate for cases subject to a 20% probability of an affirmance 
mistake. Thus, although all sets of cases have a true error of 75%, a 
court using the estimates to focus judicial attention for the purposes of 
error correction would prioritize some over others. 
 
 
 169. In Appendix Figure 1, I assume that panel mistakes occur at 80% of instability. While I 
suspect that mistakes are not so frequent, the assumption aids visualization. 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1: THE EXPECTED EFFECT OF PANEL MISTAKES ON 




The first thing to note is that even a high rate of inattentive 
panel mistakes (e.g., 20%) does not cause dramatic departures from 
the world where there are not mistakes. Second, there are two ways to 
look at the issue of inattentive panel mistakes. On the one hand, an 
abundance of panel mistakes would cause error estimates to be less 
accurate. On the other hand, an abundance of panel mistakes would 
mean that courts are more in need of statistical precedent. And even 
where mistakes are plentiful, error estimates can still direct 
attention—albeit less precisely—toward the decisions that need it. 
Nonetheless, the sets of decisions that are routinely and 
mistakenly affirmed are of particular concern. Their systematically 
deflated error estimates can prevent courts from rectifying past 
deficiencies in attention. The problem may be especially pronounced 
with pro se appeals and other sets of appeals that are routinely 
assigned to staff attorneys. 
Inattentive panel mistakes also affect estimates of instability. 
As with error estimates, expected instability estimates still tend to 
increase with true instability. But there is an exception if mistakes 
are systematically more likely to be affirmances. Because such 
mistakes would cause systematic understatements of error, and 
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decrease after error reaches 50%, the effects are dependent both on 
which side of the 50% threshold a case is and whether the mistakes 
cause the case to cross the threshold. 
B. Estimating Instability and Adjusting Error Estimates 
Estimating instability requires predicting whether each panel 
would reverse each case, and this poses an acute challenge: data is 
critical to accurate estimates, but because the same three judges sit 
together so infrequently, data on any one panel is extremely limited. 
My approach consists of five main steps. First, I use each individual 
judge’s decisions in the primary training set to build models of each 
individual judge.170 Because most individual judges have made a large 
number of decisions, a machine learning algorithm can make progress 
in modeling an individual judge’s decisions. For each judge, I also 
build a model on a randomly selected control group of other judges’ 
votes.171 With both a control and treatment model for each judge, it is 
possible to estimate each judge’s case-specific “voting deviation,” or 
how the judge’s probability of voting to reverse each case differs from 
her colleagues’ probabilities. The remaining problem is that we are 
interested in estimating each panel’s probability of reversing each 
case, but we have little idea how three judges’ different voting 
deviations aggregate to form an ultimate panel decision (previous 
research has clearly demonstrated that judges do not vote sincerely—
their votes are affected by the other members of the panel172). The 
second step addresses this problem. The idea is to estimate the panel 
reversal probability by building a predictive model with the secondary 
training set, which can now have panel member voting deviations as 
variables. The difficulty is that the secondary training set is small—
we just used the larger, primary training set to estimate the voting 
 
 170. I group together judges who have made fewer than one hundred decisions (mostly 
judges sitting by designation). 
 171. The reason for this complexity is that machine learning is data hungry—more data 
allows for more sophisticated and accurate models. Thus, simply comparing predictions 
generated from models of different judges who have decided a different number of cases may 
inflate estimates of interpanel conflict. Consider, for example, two panels that would decide all 
cases in an identical manner. One panel has decided only fifty cases, while another has decided 
one hundred. For the first panel, the best an algorithm might be able to do is predict the overall 
mean—there may not be enough data for the algorithm to take on more variance to reduce bias. 
Say, then, that the predictions for the first panel are 30% for all cases. For the second panel, 
there is enough data for a slightly more complex model. For simplicity, assume the model 
generates two different predictions: 10% for pro se appeals and 50% for represented appeals. 
Without accounting for sample size, we would consistently estimate a 20% disagreement rate 
between the panels even though they would actually decide all cases identically. 
 172. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 79, at 20–21 tbl.2-1. 
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deviations—so we cannot rely on it for the task of both aggregating 
voting deviations and for predicting reversal more generally. My 
solution is to use the unitary court model (developed in order to obtain 
preliminary estimates of error and instability) to generate probability 
of reversal estimates that can be used as variables in the secondary 
training set. The secondary training set, though relatively small, now 
has access to condensed information on the voting tendencies of both 
individual judges and the collective court, and we can efficiently 
estimate the aggregate results. In the fourth step, then, I use the 
judge models (built with the primary training set) to generate 
predictions for each judge’s voting deviations for each case in the test 
set. The test set now includes, as variables, predictions from both the 
unitary court model and for each judge’s predicted effect on the 
outcome of a case. In the fifth step, I then use the model that was built 
on the secondary training set (to efficiently aggregate voting 
idiosyncrasies and collective court patterns) in order to estimate the 
probability that one thousand randomly selected panel combinations 
would reverse each case in the test set.173 
Appendix Figure 2 displays the basic adjustment process. The 
independent estimates can first serve as a check on the preliminary 
estimates. Here, the relationship is encouraging but far from ideal. 
The desired pattern is beginning to take shape: independent estimates 
of instability increase with error at first and then level off and even 
begin decreasing after 50% error. But the estimates could clearly be 
more consistent—one witness is reporting a 6’2’’ suspect while the 
other is reporting a 5’10’’ suspect.  
The next three panels of Appendix Figure 2 illustrate the 
adjustment process. The second panel displays independent estimates 
of instability after they are rescaled to match the scale of the 
preliminary estimates of instability.174 The third panel shows the 
relationship between the rescaled estimates and the error 
probabilities after they have been adjusted to better match the 
rescaled estimates of instability.175 The fourth panel displays the final 
 
 173. For computational convenience, I estimate reversal probabilities for one thousand 
randomly selected panels rather than all possible panel combinations. 
 174. I also make use of outside information in hopes of improving the rescale. First, 
instability cannot be higher than 50%. Second, it is very likely that there are a number of cases 
that all panels would agree should be reversed. I thus rescale from 0% to 50%. 
 175. In accordance with the discussion in Section II.C, I increase the weight given to the 
probabilities of error that are implied by the independent estimates of instability as the 
preliminary estimates of error move further from the 50% error threshold. For each percentage 
point from the threshold, I give the independent estimates 3% more weight, with a max weight of 
50% for the independent estimates. A case with a 49% or 51% preliminary error probability is 
thus adjusted 3% toward the independent estimate, and a case with a 48% or 52% preliminary 
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stage of estimation, where the final estimates of error are matched 
with final estimates of instability. Appendix Figure 3 displays the 
distributions of those adjustments to error estimates. 
 







error probability is adjusted 6% toward the independent estimate. The choices of 3% increases 
and a cap of 50% weight were selected as a matter of judgment. Optimal weightings and caps 
should be the subject of future research. Here, my intent was to show that the estimation process 
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